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DECIPHERING THE CHEMICAL SOUP:
USING PUBLIC NUISANCE TO COMPEL
CHEMICAL TESTING
Albert C. Lin*
The problem of toxic ignorance plagues modern society. On a daily basis,
each of us is exposed to hundreds of chemicals, the vast majority of which have
been subject to little or no testing to determine whether they are toxic to humans
or the environment. Many of these chemicals may turn out to be harmless.
Some, however, may cause cancer, reproductive defects, and other harms. In
toto, chemicals are believed to be responsible for tens of thousands of deaths per
year. The systematic failure of manufacturers and distributors to test chemical
substances is a rational response to marketplace incentives, tort liability rules,
and existing chemical regulations. To address the problem of toxic ignorance,
this Article proposes the recognition of a new type of public nuisance to compel
chemical testing. In contrast to conventional toxic tort litigation, which
requires a showing of physical injury, the failure to test itself would constitute a
public nuisance. Inadequate testing puts the public health at risk, and the
resultant lack of information undermines the ability of governments and indi-
viduals to protect public health. In addition to explaining the basis for apply-
ing public nuisance doctrine to the failure to test, the Article also examines
practical considerations relating to how courts would enforce the duty to con-
duct testing.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a chemical soup. On a daily basis, each of us is
exposed to hundreds of chemicals, the vast majority of which have
been subject to little or no testing to determine whether they are toxic
to humans or the environment.' Many of these chemicals will turn
out to be harmless, but others will have detrimental or even devastat-
1 See Marla Cone, Chemicals Get the Safe Treatment, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, at
Al (reporting that tests of umbilical cords show that a newborn's body contains nearly
300 chemical compounds); Douglas Fischer, Study Ties Pollution to Cancer, OAKLAND
TRIB., May 14, 2007, at 1 (reporting that "[wiomen face daily and widespread expo-
sure to hundreds of chemicals linked to breast cancer"); Douglas Fischer, The Great
Experiment, OAKLAND TRIB., Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.insidebayarea.com/
bodyburden/ci_2600903 (stating that "[t]housands of chemicals are found in every-
day consumer products" and that "EPA has full toxicity data for about 25 percent [of
them]"); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NATIONAL REPORT ON HuMAN ExPosuRE To ENVIRONMENTAL
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ing effects that will become apparent only with the passage of time.
The problem of toxic ignorance is widely recognized, yet legislatures,
regulatory agencies, courts, and the chemical industry have done rela-
tively little to address the problem. Without analyzing the risks posed
by chemicals before they become widely distributed, it is difficult to
determine the precautions that should be taken or the scope of any
health and environmental problems that may result. Experiences in
which we have discovered the hazards of chemical substances belat-
edly-ranging from asbestos to benzene to polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs)-illustrate the potentially broad and serious consequences of
toxic ignorance.2
Uncertainty is a constant companion in scientists' efforts to
understand the phenomena occurring around us, and the field of tox-
icology is no exception to that principle.3 Rarely do we know as much
as we would like to know about cause-and-effect relationships. Yet the
level of toxic ignorance that surrounds us is not the inevitable result
of the limits of scientific inquiry. Rather, it is the consequence of
deliberate decisions by the chemical industry and by those who incor-
porate chemicals into their manufacturing processes to avoid testing
that would identify at least some of the likely harms.
CHEMINCALS (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/FourthRe-
port.pdf (providing recent assessment of human chemical exposure).
2 See David Gee & Morris Greenberg, Asbestos: From 'Magic' to Malevolent Mineral,
in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY 49 (Poul Harremoes et al.
eds., 2002) (describing the toxic effects of asbestos exposure); Peter F. Infante, Ben-
zene: A Historical Perspective on the American and European Occupational Setting, in THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20Tm CENTURY, supra, at 35-36 (describing poison-
ous and carcinogenic effects of use of benzene as solvent); Janna G. Koppe & Jane
Keys, PCBs and the Precautionary Principle, in THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE
20TH CENTURY, supra, at 64, 64 (describing toxic effects of PCBs, a class of organic
compounds widely used as insulators in electrical equipment). Scientists estimate that
during its peak use, asbestos was responsible for hundreds, if not thousands of deaths
per year in the United States. See Malcolm Ross, A Survey of Asbestos-Related Disease in
Trades and Mining Occupations and in Factory and Mining Communities as a Means of
Predicting Health Risks of Nonoccupational Exposures to Fibrous Minerals, in DEFINITIONS
FOR ASBESTOS AND OTHER HEALTH-RELATED SILICATES 51, 89-90, 96-97 (Benjamin
Levadie ed., 1984); see also Gee & Greenberg, supra, at 49 (estimating 250,000 to
400,000 deaths will be caused by asbestos in the European Union within a 35-year
period).
3 See COMm. ON IMPROVING RISK ANALYSIS APPROACHES USED BY THE U.S. EPA,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONs 4 (2009) [hereinafter NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS], available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?recordid=12209 (describing uncertainty as "an inherent property of
scientific data"); Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006
Wis. L. REv. 897, 968-69 (discussing uncertainty associated with toxic exposure).
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A regulatory mandate to conduct comprehensive testing is one
possible response to the problem, but such an approach would meet
formidable political resistance. It might also require significant
resources and drive useful chemicals from the market. In the absence
of such a mandate, this Article proposes the use of public nuisance
litigation for attacking the toxic ignorance problem. Part I of the Arti-
cle explains the problem of toxic ignorance and identifies various eco-
nomic and legal disincentives for chemical manufacturers to conduct
toxicity testing. In response to this problem, Part II proposes the rec-
ognition and use of a public nuisance action against chemical manu-
facturers, processors, and importers for the failure to test chemical
substances. Finally, Part III examines the important practical question
of how courts might enforce the duty to test against chemical compa-
nies; this section describes various methods of toxicity testing and sug-
gests guidelines for courts to consider.
I. THE PROBLEM OF Toxic IGNORANCE
A. Background
According to some estimates, chemical exposure is responsible
for tens of thousands of deaths per year in the United States.4 None-
theless, we have surprisingly little information about the health and
environmental effects of the thousands of chemicals that we use on a
daily basis.5 A 1998 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) study of
toxicity data on high production volume (HPV) chemicals-those
4 See Christine H. Kim, Piercing the Veil of Toxic Ignorance:Judicial Creation of Scien-
tific Research, 15 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 540, 542 (2007) (reporting an estimated 33,900
annual United States cancer deaths from occupational and environmental exposure
to pollutants); David Pimentel et al., Ecology of Increasing Disease: Population Growth and
Environmental Degradation, 48 BIOSCIENCE 817, 817, 819 (1998) (noting estimate of
30,000 cancer-related deaths per year in the United States attributable to chemical
exposure and calculating that "40% of world deaths can be attributed to various envi-
ronmental factors, especially organic and chemical pollutants"); see also COMM. ON
DEVELOPMENTAL ToxICOLOcY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENTIFIC FRONTIERS IN
DEVELOPMENTAL TOXICOLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT 1 (2000), available at http://
books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=9871 (estimating that 3% of approximately
120,000 birth defects in the United States per year are attributable to exposure to
toxic chemicals and physical agents).
5 SeeJohn S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1365, 1381-83 (2008) (discussing lack of infor-
mation); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1625-30
(2004) (describing lack of monitoring information, toxicity testing, and theoretical
understanding regarding how hazardous substances affect human health and
environment).
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three thousand or so chemicals imported or produced in the United
States in a volume of over one million pounds per year-found no
toxicity information publicly available for nearly half of the chemicals
identified.6 For only a handful of these chemicals-seven percent-
was a full set of basic toxicity information available.7 While voluntary
efforts in the last decade have sought to collect or generate more
information on the potential toxic effects of HPV chemicals, signifi-
cant information gaps remain." Toxicity data is even more lacking for
the 80,000 or so non-HPV chemicals found in commerce today.9
Expert panels and government agencies have decried the lack of
toxicity testing,10 and even the chemical industry has acknowledged
the wide information gap." Hundreds of new chemicals enter the
6 OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & Toxics, ENViL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AvAInABILrlY STUDY 2 (1998) [hereinafter EPA, CHEMICAL
HAZARD DATA], available at http://www.epa.gov/HPV/pubs/general/hazchem.pdf; see
also ENVTL. HEALTH PROGRAM, ENvTL. DEF. FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE 7, 15 (1997),
available at http://www.edf.org/documents/243_toxicignorance.pdf (reporting,
based on sample of 100 HPV chemicals, that "even the most basic toxicity testing
results cannot be found in the public record for nearly 75% of the top-volume chemi-
cals in commercial use"). An earlier study by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences found similar information gaps. See NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, NAT'L AcAD. OF Scis., Toxicrry TESTING 12 fig. 2 (1984), available at http://
books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordjid=317 (finding "minimal" toxicity informa-
tion available for only twenty-two percent of high volume chemicals).
7 See EPA, CHEMICAL HA7ARD DATA, supra note 6, at 2.
8 See infra Part I.D.3.
9 See CTRS. FOR OCCUPATIONAL & ENVrL. HEALTH, UNIV. OF CAL., GREEN CHEMIS-
TRY 1 (2008), available at http://coeh.berkeley.edu/docs/news/green_chem-brief.
pdf ("[H]ealth and environmental effects of the great majority [of such chemicals]
... are largely unknown."); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULA-
TION 1-2 (2005) [hereinafter GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION], available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf (stating there are over 82,000 chemicals listed in
EPA's Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) inventory); Applegate, supra note 5, at
1383 (contending that studies finding data gap for chemical testing likely understate
extent of problem because studies focus on HPV chemicals, for which presumably
greatest amount of data exists).
10 See Wendy Wagner, Using Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data
Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 636 & n.40 (2008) (listing studies that recommend more toxicity
testing).
11 See EPA, CHEMICAL HAzARD DATA, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing analysis by
Chemical Manufacturers Association concluding that forty-seven percent of chemicals
studied had full screening information data); cf Testimony of Michael P. Wilson, PhD,
MPH, Univ. of Cal., Berkley Before the S. Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 2
(2006), available at http://epw.senate.gov/109th/WilsonTestimony.pdf (describing
inability of manufacturers and other businesses to identify and replace hazardous
chemicals); Mark Schapiro, Toxic Inaction: Why Poisonous, Unregulated Chemicals End Up
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flow of commerce each year, exacerbating the situation.' 2 With the
commercialization of nanotechnology, a rapidly developing field that
is creating substances with new physical and chemical properties and
often unknown toxicological effects, the information gap threatens to
expand into an information chasm.13
Toxicity information is essential to EPA, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, and other regulatory agencies whose mis-
sion is to protect public health and the environment. The absence of
toxicity data hampers these agencies' ability to carry out basic regula-
tory tasks such as conducting risk assessments, developing safety
guidelines, setting regulatory standards, defending regulations from
legal challenges, and warning the public about potential hazards. 14
Ultimately, the information gap leaves the government unable to pro-
tect the public and the public unable to protect itself.
Lack of toxicity information undermines the tort system as well.
Ideally, toxic tort claims further social goals of compensation, deter-
rence, and corrective justice.15 Injured plaintiffs receive compensa-
tion for their harms, potential defendants are deterred by the threat
of liability, and those entities responsible for plaintiffs' harms are
required to restore plaintiffs to their original position.' 6 In reality,
however, environmental toxic tort plaintiffs are frustrated by gaps in
knowledge regarding causation, risk, and harm."7 Often the most sig-
nificant of these obstacles is causation.' 8 Toxicity testing has the
in Our Blood, HARPER'S MAG., Oct. 2007, at 78, 80-81 (reporting chemical industry
representative's praise of ineffective toxic regulatory statute).
12 See U.S. Gov'T AccouNrABILITY OFFICE, supra note 9, at 1-2 (noting over seven
hundred new chemicals are introduced into commerce each year).
13 SeeJeffrey Rudd, Regulating the Impacts of Engineered Nanoparticles Under TSCA:
Shifting Authority from Industry to Government, 33 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 215, 229 (2008)
(expressing concerns regarding prioritization of "commercialization of nanoparticles
over the EPA's ability to assess and regulate the risks that nanoparticles pose to public
health and the environment"). See generally Albert C. Lin, Size Matters: Regulating
Nanotechnology, 31 HARv. ENVrTL. L. REv. 349 (2007) (arguing that existing regulatory
authority is inadequate to handle developments in nanotechnology and proposing a
new legislative framework).
14 See EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 2.
15 See Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims ofEnvironmental Toxic Injury,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1452-60 (2005) (discussing objectives of tort system and how
latency and difficulties in proving causation undermine the system's ability to achieve
these objectives).
16 See id. at 1453.
17 See id. at 1441.
18 See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New The-
ory ofjustice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2120 (1997) ("[C]ausation is the
central, decisive factor in mass tort litigation.").
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potential to generate information on the ability of a chemical to cause
illness, but the lack of such testing often prevents plaintiffs from estab-
lishing a prima facie case. Even when the available data is sufficient to
support a regulatory response, it is usually insufficient to support a
finding of causation in an individual tort case.19 In these cases, courts
often require proof that exposure to a chemical doubled the plain-
tiff's risk of harm, or they may demand particularistic proof of a causal
connection.20 Magnifying the difficulty of the task faced by toxic tort
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.21 established a rigorous standard for admitting
scientific expert testimony. Daubert made clear that federal trial
judges must serve as gatekeepers for scientific testimony by examining
for themselves the reliability of the methods underlying expert testi-
mony.22 The application of Daubert in toxic tort cases has led many
courts to reject proposed expert testimony, particularly that proffered
by plaintiffs, as too unreliable in light of scientific uncertainty and
incomplete scientific knowledge.23
B. Incentives Not to Test
The toxic ignorance problem is the unsurprising result of
rational decisions by chemical manufacturers not to conduct extensive
testing.24 Our legal system generally assumes that chemicals are
"innocent until proven guilty"; we restrict chemical manufacture and
19 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1307 (1998) (explaining that in "deciding whether to impose a
regulatory restriction, the agency asks whether there is sufficient evidence of a gen-
eral causal relationship between substance A and injury X to justify imposition of a
regulatory restriction," whereas in a tort case, a court must decide the distinct ques-
tion of "whether a particular manufacturer of substance A is legally and financially
responsible for a particular injury to a particular individual"). In the narrower con-
text of product liability actions involving exposure to potentially toxic substances, cau-
sation poses a less imposing barrier. In such actions, plaintiffs may be able to
establish liability based on a failure to warn that a product might be harmful, without
having to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the product is harm-
ful. See Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 VAND. L.
REv. 1011, 1018 (2001).
20 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1449-51 & n.45 (noting cases involving specific causa-
tion in environmental toxic injuries).
21 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
22 See id. at 589-95.
23 See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MIcH. L. REv. 257, 258, 260-67 (2005) (contending that
toxic tort plaintiffs' difficulties "have increased exponentially" as result of Daubert);
Lin, supra note 15, at 1451 & n.54 (citing cases and commentary).
24 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1622-25.
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distribution only if and when harm is demonstrated.2 5 To make mat-
ters worse, the system largely excuses manufacturers from having to
produce toxicity information, and as described further below, even
gives manufacturers incentives not to test. In theory, government
agencies, consumer organizations, and others can step in and perform
toxicological research on their own. These actors, however, rarely
have the resources to do so. 26 In addition, they may not be able to
access the information needed to conduct safety testing because of
trade secret claims by manufacturers.2 7 Consequently, society relies
heavily on chemical manufacturers to do the testing themselves.2 8
Manufacturers have the greatest familiarity with their products
and the most opportunities to learn about them, can channel the
results of safety testing back into product design to avoid injuries, and
can spread the costs of testing among customers.2 9 Various factors
discourage manufacturers from generating toxicity information, how-
ever. First, thorough toxicity testing can be expensive, and manufac-
turers cannot easily profit from investments in producing toxicity
data.30 In ordinary product development research, companies trans-
form knowledge from that research into private gain through the
25 See Carl F. Cranor, Do You Want to Bet Your Children's Health on Post-Market Harm
Principles? An Argument for a Trespass or Permission Model for Regulating Toxicants, 19
VILL. ENvrL. L.J. 251, 252 (2008). See generally Lin, supra note 3 (contending that
environmental law has generally responded to demonstrated harm).
26 SeeJohn S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Pol-
icy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLum. L. REV. 261, 298-99 (1991) ("Toxicology
information is too expensive for workers and consumers (or even unions and con-
sumer organizations) to generate."); id. at 306-07 (concluding that "[t]here will
never be enough money in a federal or state budget to fill the existing data gaps on a
chemical-by-chemical basis," given the number of substances for which testing would
be required); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products,
82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 789 (1997).
27 See Wagner, supra note 26, at 798; Wagner, supra note 5, at 1645, 1699-1705.
See generally Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health
and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARv. L. REV. 837
(1980) (arguing for broad disclosure of health and safety data, notwithstanding trade
secret claims).
28 See Applegate, supra note 26, at 299.
29 See Wagner, supra note 26, at 798-802.
30 See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws
to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1795, 1813 (1989) (noting that benefits from
toxicological research, including health information and identification of externali-
ties, "may not be recovered by individual firms, or their impact may not be easily
identifiable as the results of one company's research"); Wagner, supra note 5, at
1634-35 (noting high out-of-pocket costs associated with safety research); see alsoJen-
nifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1121
(1993) ("Manufacturers do not benefit from proving that their product is free from a
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development and sale of marketable products.31 By contrast, it is
much more difficult for private entities to capture the value of infor-
mation generated from toxicity research.32 Indeed, from a company's
perspective, investment in such research is risky if not unwise.33 It is
impossible for studies to establish that a substance poses no risks at all,
whereas results suggesting a potential hazard could trigger negative
publicity as well as an obligation to do additional, more costly test-
ing. 3 4 Moreover, because of the long-term and latent effects fre-
quently involved in toxic exposure, chemical toxicity is not readily
visible to consumers.3 5 This gives manufacturers little economic
incentive to undertake research that might only identify and docu-
ment toxic effects.36 In the resultant market, untested chemicals-
which will appear to the consumer to pose no detrimental risks-pos-
sess an advantage over chemicals having some indication of potential
toxicity.3 7 Although it is theoretically possible for a manufacturer to
gain a commercial advantage by marketing a tested product as "safe,"
the ease of making such claims and the difficulty of verifying them
often lead consumers to discount them.38
C. Tort Law Exacerbates the Ignorance Problem
1. The Duty to Test
In theory, liability rules promote toxicity research by giving man-
ufacturers an incentive to ensure that their products are reasonably
safe. Indeed, tort law imposes on manufacturers an unequivocal duty
to test their products for dangers associated with their use.39 This
risk-if indeed it is-if consumers do not expect the product to be risky in the first
place.").
31 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1631.
32 See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1813; Wagner, supra note 5, at 1631-32.
33 See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1813; Wagner, supra note 5, at 1631-32.
34 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1635-36.
35 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1446.
36 See Applegate, supra note 26, at 299; Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1813-14; Alan
Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the
Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 700-01, 710 (1985); Wagner, supra
note 5, at 1631-32. Moreover, corporate managers face short-term profit motivations
that further disfavor testing. See Berger, supra note 18, at 2138-39; Wagner, supra
note 26, at 785.
37 See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1814.
38 See id. at 1816 ("Even when privately produced information is of high quality,
the commercial context diminishes its credibility and, thus, its value."); Wagner, supra
note 10, at 635.
39 See AMERICAN LAw OF PRODUCTS LABILITY § 11:1 (John D. Hodson & Charles J.
Nagy, Jr. eds., 3d rev. ed. 2005) (explaining that duty to test and inspect products is
2010] 963
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duty includes the duty to test for toxic risks associated with the use of
chemical products. 4 0 As the Third Restatement of Torts notes:
Of course, a seller bears responsibility to perform reasonable testing
prior to marketing a product and to discover risks and risk-avoid-
ance measures that such testing would reveal. A seller is charged
with knowledge of what reasonable testing would reveal. If testing is
not undertaken, or is performed in an inadequate manner, and this
failure results in a defect that causes harm, the seller is subject to
liability for harm caused by such defect.4 1
Numerous cases recognize the existence of a duty to test for
hazards. 42 In light of this duty, manufacturers are presumed to have
the knowledge of an expert in the field and to be aware of reasonably
foreseeable dangers. 43 Under certain circumstances, a manufacturer
may have a continuing duty to test for hazards after the sale of a prod-
an aspect of manufacturer's duty of reasonable care); Wagner, supra note 26, at
803-04 (describing duty "to resolve at least basic preventable scientific uncertainties
prior to marketing a product").
40 See 72A C.J.S. Products Liability § 112 (2004) (stating that "manufacturer of a
chemical, a dangerous product, is under a duty to exercise a high degree of care,"
which "includes the duty to inspect or test the chemical product").
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODUcTs LIABILITY § 2 (1998).
42 See Messer v. Amway Corp., 106 F. App'x 678, 686 (10th Cir. 2004) (recogniz-
ing duty to test under Kansas law); George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.
1990) ("[A] manufacturer has a duty to test fully and inspect its products to uncover
all dangers that are scientifically discoverable."); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d
456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding, in products liability action, that asbestos manufac-
turers had "duty to fully test their products to uncover all scientifically discoverable
dangers before the products are sold"); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517,
1527 (D. Minn. 1989) ("[A] manufacturer has a duty to inspect and test its prod-
ucts."); Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 841 N.E.2d 1037, 1043-45 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(upholding finding that defendants breached duty to investigate health hazards asso-
ciated with welding); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 562
(Tex. App. 1996), affd 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (same); see also AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUcTs LIABiry, supra note 39, § 11:8 (noting manufacturer must conduct reason-
able testing to demonstrate product's safety under conditions matching product's
expected use).
43 See George, 914 F.2d at 28-29 (holding asbestos manufacturer could be charged
with knowledge of adverse health effects based on what it "reasonably should have
known had it either conducted its own tests or been in contact with others in the
industry . .. that were testing"); Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089; Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 269 (Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (charging manufacturer "with
the best scientific and medical knowledge, and with knowledge of substantial dangers
involved in [product's] reasonably foreseeable use"); Owens-Corning, 916 S.W.2d at
562 (charging asbestos manufacturer with knowledge of discoverable dangers, includ-
ing dangers known at time by other manufacturers).
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uct.44 And in some jurisdictions, manufacturers who conduct "state of
the art" testing for toxic hazards may gain a complete defense to
liability.45
2. Difficulties in Enforcing the Duty to Test
The duty to test for toxic hazards, however, is enforceable only if
a plaintiff is injured and brings a cause of action against the manufac-
turer in strict liability, negligence, negligent failure to warn, or the
like. 46 Under existing law, the failure to test for toxic hazards cannot,
by itself, serve as the basis for an independent cause of action. 47 For
many product liability cases, this is not a significant problem: plaintiffs
injured by a defective tool or appliance typically will have little diffi-
culty in identifying their injury and the manufacturer responsible for
that injury. Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases, however, face numerous
obstacles to bringing successful claims, particularly as to issues of
causation.
Specifically, toxic tort plaintiffs must prove both general causa-
tion-that a substance is capable of causing the injury at issue-and
specific causation-that exposure to the substance in fact caused the
plaintiffs' injuries. 48 Because of the extensive research required, the
44 See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528 (holding that continuing duty to test exists
where manufacturer has knowledge of problem with product, product is subject to
continued sale or advertising, and where there was preexisting duty to warn of dan-
gers associated with product).
45 See Wagner, supra note 26, at 794-95 (noting that "[s]tate-of-the-art testing
generally consists of 'all of the available knowledge of a subject at a given time,"'
including scientific, medical, engineering, and any other knowledge (quoting
Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1164 (4th Cir. 1986))).
46 See Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1527.
47 See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 919-20 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting plaintiff must show failure to test and that such failure caused harm);
Kociemba, 707 F. Supp. at 1528; Valentine, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (rejecting plaintiff's
argument for independent duty to test); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696
N.E.2d 909, 921 (Mass. 1998) ("[E]vidence of failure adequately to test a product is
relevant to claims of design, manufacturing, or warning defects, but does not furnish
a separate, independent basis for liability."); Viguers v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 837
A.2d 534, 541 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip., Inc.,
737 N.W.2d 397, 408 & n.6 (S.D. 2007) (noting plaintiff must show failure to test and
that such failure caused harm).
48 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1446-47. As Mark Geistfeld points out, a plaintiff can
avoid some of the difficulties involving causation in products liability cases by alleging
that a defendant manufacturer is liable for failing to warn that a product might be
carcinogenic. See Geistfeld, supra note 19, at 1018. Such warnings, even where toxic-
ity data are inconclusive, "'allow the user or consumer to avoid the risk warned against
by making an informed decision not to purchase or use the product at all and hence
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probabilistic nature of research results, and the uncertainty often asso-
ciated with those results, plaintiffs are rarely in a position to prove
either general or specific causation.4 9 The manufacturer is often the
only party with the knowledge and resources to do the necessary test-
ing, but has little reason to generate the very evidence that plaintiffs
might use against it.5o For manufacturers, ignorance about potential
detrimental effects often represents a "willful, strategic choice."1'
Compounding the difficulties of potential plaintiffs, certain claims
may be available only to product users, and not to others exposed to
toxins incidentally.52 Ultimately, placing the burden of proof of cau-
sation on toxic tort plaintiffs discourages manufacturers from produc-
ing toxicity information, encourages manufacturers to hinder third-
party efforts to develop such information, and renders effective
enforcement of the duty to test impossible.
not to encounter the risk."' Id. at 1019 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTs LIABILnY § 2 cmt. m. (1998)); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD-
ucTs LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (noting seller of product must perform reasonable testing
but is not liable for unforeseeable risks).
49 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1446-47. There are a few decisions in favor of toxic
tort plaintiffs notwithstanding weak evidence on causation. See Wagner, supra note
26, at 828-32. While these decisions have sometimes been cited as examples of the
inability of judges and juries to handle complex scientific issues, Wendy Wagner
instead characterizes these cases as examples of judge or jury nullification in which
defendants are being held responsible for failing to conduct basic safety testing and
thereby depriving plaintiffs of critical causation evidence. See id.
50 See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1817; Wagner, supra note 10, at 636 ("When
virtually no toxicity information is available on a chemical product, the manufacturer
has little to fear from tort liability."). One commentator proposes to address this lack
of evidence in the context of ongoing litigation by empowering courts in class actions
to commission studies to determine general causation. See Kim, supra note 4, at 560.
This proposal might help to fill some of the information gaps in the limited number
of cases where class certification is appropriate, but would do little to address the
general problem of toxic ignorance.
51 Wagner, supra note 5, at 1638-39 (citing examples of Dalkon Shield, high-
absorbency tampons, Bendectin, DES, breast implants, and tobacco); see also Wagner,
supra note 26, at 775 (remarking that "it would be surprising if manufacturers ever
conducted voluntary research on the long-term hazards of their products," in light of
incentives generated by common law not to conduct toxicity research).
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A caveat (1965) (expressing "no
opinion" as to whether strict liability for defective products extends "to harm to per-
sons other than users or consumers"); id. cmt. o (noting courts have generally denied
recovery to casual bystanders and others who are neither users nor consumers). But
see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILiTy LAw 266-67 (2005) (noting recent cases "have
almost unanimously allowed foreseeable bystanders . . . to recover for their injuries
caused by defective products").
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D. TSCA Makes Matters Worse
Toxicity testing could be mandated by statute or as part of a regu-
latory regime. For most substances, however, existing regulatory
mechanisms require no testing at all. Rather, as explained below, the
current statutory scheme actually creates further disincentives for
manufacturers to test.
The general authority to regulate chemical substances in the
United States is found in the Toxic Substances Control Act53 (TSCA),
which gives EPA broad authority to regulate the entire life cycle of a
chemical substance-including the authority to order manufacturers
to do the testing that would address the knowledge gap. 5 4 TSCA
applies to all chemicals other than those specifically exempted
because of their coverage under other federal statutes.55 The statute
provides EPA with regulatory authority in three key areas: regulating
53 Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2692 (2006)).
54 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 95 (5th ed. 2006)
("In theory, [TSCA] is the broadest source of EPA's regulatory authority . . . .").
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2) (defining "chemical substance" to exclude pesticides,
tobacco, nuclear material, food, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, and medical
devices). Most of these exempted chemicals-pesticides and pharmaceuticals in par-
ticular-are subject to mandatory toxicity testing before they enter the stream of com-
merce. Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),
manufacturers must register a new pesticide with EPA before introducing it to the
market. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006 & Supp. II 2008). Registration requires that an appli-
cant demonstrate, through specified toxicological tests, that the product will not
cause unreasonable harm and that it will perform its intended function without
unreasonable harm. Id. § 136a(c) (5); see 40 C.F.R. pt. 158 (2009). Pharmaceuticals
are subject to an extensive premarket approval process administered by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). That process includes submis-
sion of an Investigational New Drug Application containing the results of pharmaco-
logical and toxicological studies and three phases of human clinical trials to
determine effectiveness and toxicity. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.20, 312.23 (2009) (clinical
trials); id. §§ 314.1-314.650 (regulations governing approval of new drugs).
Although the FDA also has authority to regulate cosmetics, it has interpreted that
authority narrowly, placing the responsibility on cosmetic manufacturers to deter-
mine the safety of their own products before marketing. See Lin, supra note 13, at
373.
The regulatory regimes for pesticides and pharmaceuticals do ensure that at least
some toxicity testing occurs. But as litigation against the manufacturers of Vioxx and
Prozac illustrates, even these requirements hardly guarantee discovery of all serious
health risks. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 23, at 261 (commenting that safety
studies done to obtain FDA approval often are inadequate to identify all toxic effects
because of various factors, including their relatively short timeframe and small size);
Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95
GEO. L.J. 693, 711-12 (2007) (discussing role of pharmaceutical litigation in uncover-
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chemicals that present health or environmental risks,56 testing chemi-
cals that are already in commerce but present unknown risks,57 and
screening new chemicals and significant new uses of existing chemi-
cals.5 8 Despite this seemingly broad authority, the vast majority of
chemicals on the market have been subject to little or no testing. A
closer examination of the provisions of TSCA and EPA practice under
those provisions explains why.
1. TSCA Does Not Require Toxicity Testing
For chemicals already in commerce, section 4 of TSCA authorizes
EPA to review potential health risks and to require manufacturers to
conduct toxicity testing. TSCA, however, does not mandate that EPA
undertake chemical risk reviews. Nor does TSCA impose on manufac-
turers a self-executing duty to conduct toxicity tests. Rather, EPA
must first promulgate a rule before a manufacturer has the obligation
to test a chemical.5 9 In the rule, EPA must establish that the chemical
"may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment,"60 or that it "will be produced in substantial quantities" and
result in "substantial human exposure" or entry of "substantial quanti-
ties" into the environment.61 Issuing test rules under section 4 has
proven to be cumbersome: the process of finalizing such a rule may
take two to ten years and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars.6 2
Since 1979, EPA has reviewed the safety of only two percent of the
ing hidden company documents and in raising public consciousness about misdeeds
of drug companies).
56 Section 6 of TSCA authorizes EPA to regulate any chemical substance if it finds
that there is a "reasonable basis to conclude" that such an activity "presents or will
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a) (2006). This standard has proven difficult for EPA to meet. See Corrosion
Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215-17, 1220, 1222 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring
EPA to balance cost of regulations against their benefits, to evaluate availability of
substitutes for chemical in question, and to apply least burdensome regulatory mea-
sure that provides adequate protection).
57 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006).
58 See id. § 2604 (2006).
59 See id. § 2603(a).
60 See id. § 2603(a) (1) (A) (i).
61 See id. § 2603(a) (1) (B) (i).
62 See GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 26; see also Applegate, supra
note 26, at 315 (noting "elaborate procedures for development, promulgation, and
judicial review" of test rules); Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1824 ("TSCA's use of strict
rulemaking standards inhibits the very information production the statute was written
to encourage."); Wagner, supra note 10, at 632 (describing Section 4 requirements as
"a classic Catch-22" situation in which EPA must have some risk information in order
to justify testing to determine risk).
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62,000 chemicals known to EPA at the time, and it has required test-
ing for fewer than two hundred chemicals.6 3
New chemicals are subject to somewhat greater regulation, but
hardly receive thorough scrutiny. Section 5 of TSCA requires manu-
facturers to provide a premanufacture notice (PMN) before begin-
ning to manufacture a new chemical. 64 Although EPA may take
action to control unreasonable risks it identifies, manufacture of the
chemical can proceed unless EPA acts on the PMN within ninety
days. 65 In filing a PMN, manufacturers must submit to EPA any test
data in their possession or control related to health or environmental
effects, as well as a description of any other toxicity data of which they
are aware. 66 TSCA, however, does not require that manufacturers
generate such data in the first instance.6 7 Not surprisingly, most
chemical companies do not perform toxicity testing voluntarily: only
fifteen percent of PMNs contain health and safety test data.68 In the
absence of such data, EPA relies heavily on analysis of structure activ-
ity relationships (SARs) to screen for and assess potential risks. This
methodology involves the use of models to predict likely biological
activity by comparing the molecular structure of new chemicals with
the structure of chemicals with existing toxicity data.69 While EPA
believes that these models are effective as screening tools to identify
chemicals meriting closer review, the agency admits that the overall
accuracy of these models has not been validated. 70
63 See GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 18.
64 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a). Section 5 of TSCA also gives EPA the authority to evalu-
ate significant new uses of existing chemicals. Id. In order to determine that there is
a significant new use, however, EPA must promulgate a rule pursuant to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. Id. § 2604(a)(2). A company subject to such a rule must pro-
vide a significant new use notice (SNUN), which is similar to a PMN. See id.;
ELIZABETH C. BROWN ET AL., ENVTL. LAW INST., TSCA DESKBOOK 36-37 (1999).
65 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(a)-(b). EPA takes no action on the vast majority of
PMNs. See JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND
HAZARDOUS WASTES 611 (2000); see also Applegate, supra note 5, at 1387 (describing
PMN requirement as "relatively toothless").
66 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(1).
67 See id. § 2604; GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 10.
68 See GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 10-11 (reporting EPA
estimate).
69 See id. at 11; LLuRA ROBINSON & IAN THORN, TOXICOLOGY AND ECOTOXICOLOGY
IN CHEMICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 123 (2005).
70 See GAO, CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 9, at 12. But cf NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ToXicITY TESTING IN THE 21sT CENTURY 99-100 (2007), available at http://
www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid=11970 (describing successful applications of
SAR analysis). Validation refers to the process by which the relevance and reliability
of a test method are assessed for a particular purpose. See Michael Balls, International
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2. TSCA Creates Disincentives to Test
Not only does TSCA fail to require toxicity testing for either new
or existing chemicals, but various provisions of the statute discourage
manufacturers from conducting tests voluntarily. First, section 6 of
TSCA imposes on EPA the burden of proving "an unreasonable risk of
injury to health or the environment" as a prerequisite for regulation.7 1
This burden gives manufacturers a disincentive to produce risk infor-
mation and an incentive to demand that EPA support any findings of
risk with cost-benefit analysis and quantitative data.7 2 Voluntary test-
ing is further discouraged by TSCA's requirement that manufacturers
notify EPA of any information that "reasonably supports the conclu-
sion that [the chemical] presents a substantial risk of injury to health
or the environment . . . ."7 Thus, a manufacturer who conducts
extensive safety testing runs the risk of generating data to support reg-
ulation and of attracting scrutiny from plaintiffs' attorneys and regula-
tors, with little potential marketing benefit.74
3. The HPV Challenge Program Has Done Little to Bridge the
Data Gap
In an effort to shrink the toxics data gap, at least as to chemicals
produced in large volumes, EPA and the chemical industry entered
into a voluntary initiative, the High Production Volume Challenge
Program.75 Under the program, chemical companies made commit-
ments to "sponsor" HPV chemicals by making screening-level toxicity
information available to the public.7 6 Sponsors pledged to propose
and undertake test plans to develop data where screening information
Validation and Barriers to the Validation of Alternative Tests, in ALTERNATIVES TO ANIMAL
TESTINc 28, 28-29 (R.E. Hester & R.M. Harrison eds., 2006).
71 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006); see supra note 56.
72 See Wagner, supra note 5, at 1682-87; Wagner, supra note 10, at 632; see also
Applegate, supra note 5, at 1388 (discussing burdens placed on EPA by TSCA).
73 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (2006). This mandatory reporting requirement appears to
have been ignored in numerous instances, as suggested by the fact that companies
volunteered 11,000 studies of their products in response to a 1996 EPA offer of sub-
stantially reduced penalties for noncompliance with that requirement. See Wagner,
supra note 5, at 1648.
74 See Wagner, supra note 10, at 630; see also Wagner, supra note 26, at 820
("[T]he manufacturing community appears to believe that safety research regarding
latent harms invites, rather than wards off, litigation.").
75 See Data Collection and Development on High Production Volume (HPV)
Chemicals, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,686, 81,692 (Dec. 26, 2000); David W. Case, The EPA's HPV
Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap?, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 147, 160-62 (2005).
76 See Case, supra note 75, at 160. Screening-level information includes the mini-
mum amount of data necessary to make an initial hazard assessment of a chemical.
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was unavailable.77 Announced in 1998, the program set a 2004 dead-
line for the final submission of data and a 2005 deadline for publica-
tion of the data.78
The results of the HPV Challenge have been mixed. Most of the
chemicals on the list were sponsored, leaving only 265 unsponsored
"orphan" chemicals.79 As of 2007, however, EPA had received final
submissions for only about half of the sponsored chemicals.80 In rela-
tively few cases did sponsors develop new data; in most instances,
sponsors relied on previously unpublished data or on alternative
methods of estimating toxicity (such as quantitative SAR analysis).81
EPA itself has questioned whether the data produced by the program
will be substantial enough to be used in risk assessment, suggesting
that the data's utility may be limited to prioritizing chemicals for fur-
ther study.82 Moreover, since the program's inception, hundreds of
additional chemicals have reached HPV levels, and companies have
agreed to sponsor less than half of these emerging HPV chemicals. 3
Ultimately, the program has provided only a modest amount of data
and has done nothing to change manufacturers' disincentives to per-
form toxicity research on their products. 84
See EPA, CHEMICAL HAzARD DATA, supra note 6, at 2. For more detail, see infra Part
I.C.
77 See Case, supra note 75, at 160-62.
78 See id.
79 See ENvrL. DEF., HIGH HOPES, LOW MARKS 11 (2007), available at http://
www.edf.org/documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf (noting that of the 2782
HPV chemicals originally identified by EPA, 1899 were sponsored by industry, 425
were exempted or otherwise removed by EPA, 193 were sponsored under another
program, and 265 were unsponsored).
80 See id. at 13.
81 See id. at 25; Kim, supra note 4, at 547.
82 See Sarah Bayko, Note, Reforming the Toxic Substances Control Act to Protect
America's Most Precious Resource, 14 SE. ENvrL. L.J. 245, 273 (2006) ("EPA questions
whether the data will prove substantial enough to use in risk assessments; the data
may only help EPA with comparative risk analysis to prioritize chemicals that are of
the most concern.").
83 See ENvrL. DEF., supra note 79, at 23.
84 See Case, supra note 75, at 196; Kim C. Lobring, Nanoscale Materials: Can (and
Should) We Regulate the Next Industrial Revolution?, 2006 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 313,
330 ("Unfortunately, the HPV Challenge Program does nothing to change a commer-
cial participant's incentive to remain ignorant of the potential effects to health or the
environment caused by their products.").
2010] 971
972 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:3
II. ARTICULATING AN ENFORCEABLE DurY To TEST IN PUBLIC
NUISANCE DOCTRINE
As explained above, manufacturers of chemical substances have a
duty under tort law to test those substances before introducing them
into commerce or otherwise exposing the public to them.85 Anecdo-
tal evidence suggests that the American public generally assumes that
manufacturers carry out this duty and that chemicals in commerce
have been tested for health, safety, and environmental effects.86 In
fact, however, current testing efforts are grossly inadequate. For the
various reasons just identified, the duty to test is rarely enforced, and
the existing legal structure actually discourages manufacturers from
performing the necessary tests.87
To address this failing, I propose the recognition of a new type of
public nuisance for the failure to test chemical substances. This cause
of action would be enforceable against manufacturers, processors, or
importers of such substances. In contrast to conventional toxic tort
litigation, however, no showing of physical injury would be required.
Rather, the failure to test itself constitutes a public nuisance because
that failure puts the public health at risk and because the resultant
lack of information undermines the ability of governments and indi-
viduals to protect public health. This Part explains the legal founda-
tion for this cause of action.
A. Public Nuisance Doctrine
Originating in common law criminal prosecutions by the King to
address encroachments upon the royal domain, public nuisance is
85 See supra Part I.C..
86 See Cranor, supra note 25, at 310 (noting some citizens feel "surprised" when
they learn about the presence of industrial chemicals in their bodies); Wagner, supra
note 26, at 784 ("Consumers appear to assume that most products are safe, regardless
of the presence or absence of costly research programs."); Cambridge Reports,
National Omnibus Survey, Dec. 1994, available at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.
edu/ipoll.html (reporting 55% of respondents answered "yes" and 38% answered
"no" in response to survey asking whether "the chemical industry does a good job in
trying to protect consumers from the possible chemical risks of their products"); Cam-
bridge Reports, National Omnibus Survey, Dec. 1993, available at http://www.roper
center.uconn.edu/ipoll.html (reporting two-thirds of respondents disagreed with
statement that "[w]e should assume a chemical is safe unless tests prove it to be
dangerous").
87 See supra Parts I.C.2, I.D.2.
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more commonly a source of civil tort liability today.88 The quasi-crimi-
nal nature of the tort of public nuisance nevertheless is reflected in
one commentator's remark that "the sovereign's suit against a nui-
sance is not a tort action, but an exercise of the police power." 9 This
power is a broad one, with public nuisance encompassing any "unrea-
sonable interference with a right common to the general public."90
Public nuisance includes a wide variety of conduct ranging from
actions harmful to public health to behavior deemed damaging to
public morals.9' Plaintiffs have asserted public nuisance claims suc-
cessfully in response to various environmental problems, including
dust, smoke, noise, odors, and releases of hazardous chemicals.92
Attempts to apply public nuisance theory in recent environmental liti-
gation include actions against automobile manufacturers and opera-
tors of coal-fired power plants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as actions against lead paint companies to recoup the cost of lead
abatement.93 Given the breadth of conduct that might fall within its
88 See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 741, 790-809 (2003) (providing a historical account of the development
of public nuisance doctrine).
89 See Louise A. Halper, Public Nuisance and Public Plaintiffs: Rediscovering the Com-
mon Law (Part 1), 16 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,292, 10,292 (1986).
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B(1) & cmt. a (1979).
91 See William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 999
(1966) (describing public nuisance as "a species of catch-all low-grade criminal
offense, consisting of an interference with the rights of the community at large, which
may include anything from the blocking of a highway to a gaming-house or indecent
exposure").
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (1979); Denise E. Antolini &
Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,114,
10,120-21 (2008) (listing examples of circumstances in which environmental harms
have been found to be public nuisances). In contrast to private nuisance, public nui-
sance does not require proof of interference with use and enjoyment of land. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B cmt. h; Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra, at
10,120.
93 See Matthew F. Pawa, Global Warming: The Ultimate Public Nuisance, in CREATIVE
COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 107 (Clifford Recht-
schaffen & Denise Antolini eds., 2007) [hereinafter CREATIVE COMMON LAw STRATE-
GIES]; Katie J. Zoglin, Getting the Lead Out: The Potential of Public Nuisance in Lead-Based
Paint Litigation, in CREATIVE COMMON LAw STRATEGIES, supra, at 339. District courts
initially dismissed the climate change public nuisance claims on political question
grounds. See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d
265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). Two recent court of
appeals decisions, however, allowed such claims to go forward. See Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 2009); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.
582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009).
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scope, it is not surprising that efforts to apply public nuisance doc-
trine in mass products liability cases against handgun manufacturers
and tobacco companies have fueled criticism of the doctrine as lack-
ing meaningful boundaries. 9 4
So what exactly must be proven to demonstrate a public nui-
sance? Confusion has sometimes surrounded the definition of public
nuisance, and the contours of the doctrine vary by state.95 The term
"public nuisance" sometimes refers to conduct that creates an unrea-
sonable interference with a public right, and at other times refers to
the resulting harm or damages suffered by the public at large.96 Not-
withstanding such discrepancies, the basic elements of a public nui-
sance claim can be distilled into the following elements: (1) an
unreasonable and substantial interference (2) with a public right (3)
where the defendant has control of the instrumentality causing the
nuisance.9 7 Courts and commentators are divided over the role of
fault, with some requiring that the defendant's conduct be inten-
tional, unreasonable, violative of a statute, or otherwise tortious; and
others holding that liability for public nuisance is strict.98
94 See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 88, at 834 (contending that public nuisance should
not be a means of recovering damages from product manufacturers).
95 See Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance:
A Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALs. L. REv. 359, 359
(1990); Gifford, supra note 88, at 774-75 (noting public nuisance's lack of meaning-
ful definition and discernible boundaries).
96 See Gifford, supra note 88, at 779-80 (discussing courts' different understand-
ings of the term).
97 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTs 1334 (2000) (defining public nuisance as
"a substantial and unreasonable interference with a right held in common by the
general public, in use of public facilities, in health, safety, and convenience"); Abrams
& Washington, supra note 95, at 374-75; Gifford, supra note 88, at 813-30 (outlining
"fundamental principles" governing public nuisance).
Although some definitions of public nuisance, including that found in the Second
Restatement of Torts, do not explicitly demand that the defendant be in control of the
instrumentality causing the nuisance, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B , a
majority of courts have continued to look for this traditional element. See, e.g., Cam-
den County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539 (3d
Cir. 2001) (discussing public nuisance under New Jersey law); State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 446 (R.I. 2008); Gifford, supra note 88, at 820-21 n.394 (citing
cases); Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 567-68 (2006) (discuss-
ing cases). But cf In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 510-11 (N.J. 2007) (Zazzali,
C.J., dissenting) (citing cases that reject control requirement).
98 Compare, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143
n.4 (Ohio 2002) (requiring negligence, intent, or unlawful activity), RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e ("[T]he defendant is held liable for a public nui-
sance if his interference with the public right was intentional or was unintentional
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In addition, public nuisance claims traditionally have been sub-
ject to two important limitations. First, only public authorities could
bring such claims, a feature that reflected the doctrine's common law
roots in criminal proceedings.99 Second, public authorities generally
could obtain only injunctive relief when bringing a civil public nui-
sance action.' 00 Modem precedents have relaxed these limitations to
some degree. Private plaintiffs may bring public nuisance claims if
they have suffered a "special injury"-an injury different in kind from
the public's general injury.101 And some courts allow public authori-
ties to recover damages in public nuisance actions under the theory
that the state is acting as a "quasi-sovereign" in a parens patriae
action.10 2 The following paragraphs consider the basic elements of
public nuisance in further detail.
and otherwise actionable under the principles controlling liability for negligent or
reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities."), and Gifford, supra note 88,
at 828-30 (contending failure to require fault "invites the court and jury to find a
public nuisance without guidance and standards"), with New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting landowner's claim that other
parties were responsible for chemical contamination on property and explaining that
one can be "liable for maintenance of a public nuisance irrespective of negligence or
fault"), Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 368 ("[T]he application of fault prin-
ciples is certainly erroneous; the standard of liability in a public nuisance action is
strict."), and Halper, supra note 89, at 10,294 ("[I]t does not matter with what degree
of care one hinders the exercise of common public rights .... If [they] are hindered,
whether willfully, recklessly, or carelessly, the nuisance must be abated . . . .
99 See Gifford, supra note 88, at 814.
100 See Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 379; Gifford, supra note 88, at 814
("The core concept behind public nuisance is the right of public authorities to end
defendant's conduct that harms the public, through remedies of either injunctive
relief or criminal prosecution."); see also In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 498-99
(contending that public plaintiff asserting public nuisance claim is limited to reme-
dies of abatement and recovery of costs of abatement, in contrast to private plaintiff,
who can sue for damages caused by public nuisance if he can demonstrate special
injury). Gifford further notes that "[h]istorically, the recovery of damages has been
an ancillary and unusual remedy when a public nuisance was found to exist." Gifford,
supra note 88, at 814. But see 58 Am. JUR. 2D Nuisance § 31 (2002) ("Both private and
public nuisances are actionable either for their abatement or for damages, or both.").
101 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C; DoBBS, supra note 97, at 1335;
Gifford, supra note 88, at 814. See generally Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nui-
sance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755 (2001) (propos-
ing an "actual community injury" standard to revitalize public nuisance as a broad
remedy).
102 See Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 92, at 10,120; Gifford, supra note 88,
at 784.
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Public nuisance encompasses "interference with public
rights."o10  What exactly is a "public right" for purposes of public nui-
sance doctrine? The Second Restatement of Torts describes a public right
as "one common to all members of the general public" and "collective
in nature." 1 0 4 Such a right can be distinguished from the "individual
right that everyone has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded
or negligently injured." 105 In other words, for a public right to be
violated, there must be more than an aggregation of private rights
violations.10 6 A public nuisance involves an act "that could hurt any
member of the public, not just a plaintiff situated in circumstances
unique to an individual or subsection of the general public."107 Pub-
lic rights thus include common law rights in health, safety, and com-
fort-such as the right to unobstructed highways and waterways and
the right to unpolluted air and water-as well as rights identified by
statute.108 Attempting to distill the various situations in which public
nuisance doctrine has been applied, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has suggested that public nuisance involves interference "with the use
103 See Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 92, at 10,120 ("The interference need
not be related to land, but can be much broader, affecting virtually any public
resource or place."). Public nuisance thus stands in direct contrast to private nui-
sance, which requires interference with the enjoyment of private property. See DOBBS,
supra note 97, at 1335; Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 364.
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B cmt. g.
105 Id.
106 See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 448 (R.I. 2008); Gifford, supra
note 88, at 817. But cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (noting that
"no public right as such need be involved" in those states where public nuisance is
defined to include interference with "any considerable number of persons").
107 Adams v. City of W. Hartford, No. CV064027110, 2008 WL 4253413, at *6--7
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2008) (holding that child injured in public school could
not assert public nuisance claim); Gifford, supra note 88, at 818 (questioning whether
injuries suffered in private home could be subject to public nuisance claim).
108 See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 453 (describing public right); DOBBS, supra
note 97, at 1335; Gifford, supra note 88, at 815 (describing fact patterns constituting
public nuisance under common law). California, for example, defines a nuisance as:
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, the ille-
gal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the com-
fortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free pas-
sage or use, in the customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay,
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway ....
CAL. Civ. CODE § 3479 (West 1997). Public nuisance is defined as "[a nuisance]
which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any consid-
erable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted
upon individuals may be unequal." Id. § 3480.
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of a public place or with the activities of an entire community."10 9
While the public rights that fall within the protection of public nui-
sance doctrine are broad in scope, they are not limitless. Contrasting
"public right" with the broader concept of "public interest," Donald
Gifford contends that "while it is in the public interest to promote the
health and well-being of citizens generally, there is no common law
public right to a certain standard of medical care or housing."1 10
These concerns, Gifford suggests, do not involve interference with use
of a public place or with activities of an entire community."1
The interference with public rights must be substantial (i.e., sig-
nificant) and unreasonable in order to be a public nuisance." 2 Sig-
nificance requires that the harm complained of be more than trivial,
although the mere threat of substantial harm will suffice. 1 3 The
requirements of significance and unreasonableness essentially over-
lap, as section 821B of the Second Restatement of Torts suggests. Section
821B lists various circumstances that may sustain a finding that inter-
ference with a public right is unreasonable:
(a) Whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the
public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public com-
fort or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or
administrative regulation, or
(c) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced
a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor knows or has
reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public right.1 14
Reasonability turns on the significance of the interference, as in the
first and third Restatement examples, or on a prior legislative or admin-
istrative judgment of unreasonability akin to per se negligence, as in
109 Gifford, supra note 88, at 815 (quoting Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest
Mut. Ins. Co., 646 N.W.2d 777, 788 (Wis. 2002)).
110 Gifford, supra note 88, at 815. But cf James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in
Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 813, 826-27 (2008) (suggesting that
"the concept of public rights ... is more than elusive of definition" and that "'public
rights' is just another term for public interest").
111 Gifford, supra note 88, at 815. In contrast, Gifford concedes that persons sick-
ened by exposure to secondhand smoke in public places-a situation analogous to
exposure to untested chemicals-could conceivably demonstrate interference with a
public right. Id. at 817.
112 See Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 374.
113 Id.
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979); see also DOBBS, supra note 97,
at 1334 (defining public nuisance as "a substantial and unreasonable interference
with a right held in common by the general public, in use of public facilities, in
health, safety, and convenience").
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the second example." 5 Note, moreover, that this inquiry into "rea-
sonability" is not concerned with whether the actor's conduct was neg-
ligent, but rather focuses on the resulting interference with public
rights. Consistent with this view, Donald Gifford has suggested that
courts should consider the following factors in determining whether
interference is unreasonable: "(i) the number of people susceptible,
(ii) the degree of risk of harm occurring, (iii) the duration of the risk
of harm occurring, and (iv) the severity of the harm that may
occur."" 6 In contrast to private nuisance, where the reasonableness
inquiry calls for a weighing of the gravity of the harm to the plaintiff
against the utility of the defendant's conduct," 7 public nuisance
involves no such balancing of the utilities.""
Many courts also require as an element of public nuisance that
the defendant have control of the instrumentality causing the nui-
sance.' 19 This element is rooted in the historical use of public nui-
sance by the state to enjoin conduct injuring the public health, safety,
or welfare.120 A defendant who no longer exercises possession or con-
trol, the reasoning goes, is not in position to abate a nuisance. 21 The
requirement of control has proven fatal to most attempts to apply
public nuisance doctrine against product manufacturers, including
makers of handguns and lead paint.122 In the handgun cases, states
alleged that handgun manufacturers created a public nuisance by
making handguns readily available and sought compensation for
expenses incurred in responding to handgun violence.123 In the lead
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B cmt. e.
116 Gifford, supra note 88, at 816.
117 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 826.
118 See Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 376-78 (arguing that commentary
suggesting that balancing of utilities test should apply to public nuisance claims is
impractical and contrary to precedent); see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (rejecting balancing of utilities in granting injunction to
State of Georgia against air pollution generated by defendant based on finding of
public nuisance).
119 See supra note 97.
120 See Gifford, supra note 88, at 819-20.
121 See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 449 (R.I. 2008) ("The party in
control of the instrumentality causing the alleged nuisance is best positioned to abate
it and, therefore, is legally responsible.").
122 The issue of control is sometimes subsumed within a requirement of causation.
See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1132 (Ill. 2004) (char-
acterizing control as "a relevant factor in both the proximate cause inquiry and in the
ability of the court to fashion appropriate injunctive relief").
123 See, e.g., Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp.,
273 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2001) ("The County alleges that the manufacturers'
conduct ... imposed inordinate financial burdens on the County's fisc."); City of Chi.,
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paint litigation, states sought damages from paint manufacturers as
well as abatement of lead paint in residences. 124 A number of courts
have rejected public nuisance claims in these contexts on the ground
that the respective manufacturers were no longer in control of the
instrumentality causing the nuisance and thus had no ability to abate
the nuisance.125
Some jurisdictions confronted with public nuisance claims
against product manufacturers interpret the control element more
loosely, however.126 Rather than requiring control, these courts hold
that a defendant manufacturer's acts or omissions need only be a sub-
stantial factor with respect to the harm suffered in order for the
defendant to be liable under public nuisance.127 Such decisions rec-
ognize that a manufacturer should be held responsible for the conse-
quences of its actions, even if those consequences are somewhat
removed from the manufacturer. 2 8
Finally, as noted above, courts are divided over whether fault is
necessary to demonstrate a public nuisance.129 Requiring such a
showing is inconsistent with the common law examples of nuisance,
which concern themselves primarily with redressing the interference
with a public right, rather than with judging the moral culpability of a
821 N.E.2d at 1107-09 (describing the City's complaint including assertions that the
dealers' practices had caused a large underground market for illegal firearms to
flourish).
124 In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 486-87 (N.J. 2007); Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951
A.2d at 440.
125 See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2002)
(deciding under Pennsylvania law that gun manufacturers were not liable because of
lack of control); Camden County, 273 F.3d at 541-42 (affirming dismissal of public
nuisance claim against gun manufacturers under New Jersey law); In re Lead Paint
Litig., 924 A.2d at 501 (rejecting public nuisance claims against lead paint manufac-
turers because such theory would "eliminate entirely the concept of control of the
nuisance"); Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 455 (holding that public nuisance claims
against lead paint manufacturers should have been dismissed); see also Gifford, supra
note 88, at 822 (contending that in such cases, "[t]he harm or injurious condition
allegedly created by the public nuisance clearly is not within the control of the
defendants").
126 See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003); City of Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 2002) (rejecting gun manufac-
turer's contention that lack of control of firearms at moment of harm barred liability
under public nuisance); Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 556 N.W.2d 345,
351-52 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding asbestos manufacturers liable under public nui-
sance theory).
127 See I1eto, 349 F.3d at 1212; City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
128 See 11eto, 349 F.3d at 1212-13; City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143.
129 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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defendant's conduct.o30 As one commentator has contended, "[t]he
public should not be made to suffer an unreasonable interference
with its rights merely because the entity responsible for the interfer-
ence is acting non-negligently and without bad intent."s13
B. Applying Public Nuisance Doctrine to the Failure to Test
Do the "rights common to the general public" and subject to pro-
tection against interference through a public nuisance action extend
to a right not to be exposed to untested or inadequately tested chemi-
cal substances? In other words, can public nuisance doctrine encom-
pass a company's failure to test the chemicals it manufactures before
releasing them into the stream of commerce? Even though applica-
tion of public nuisance in such situations would represent an exten-
sion beyond common law precedents, consideration of the scope,
purpose, and origins of the public nuisance doctrine suggests an
affirmative answer.
As discussed above, public nuisance essentially involves interfer-
ence with public rights. The public rights that a state may protect via
public nuisance include the collective interests of its citizens in the
quality of the state's environment, a point illustrated by Georgia v. Ten-
nessee Copper Co.,1 3 2 one of the Supreme Court's leading decisions on
public nuisance. In that case, Georgia sought to enjoin out-of-state
copper companies from discharging pollutants that were allegedly
damaging forests and crops within the state of Georgia.'33 Noting that
the case involved "a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of
quasi-sovereign," the Court observed that "[i]n that capacity the State
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in
all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabi-
tants shall breathe pure air."134 Tennessee Copper is instructive on at
least two important points. First, the decision underscores that the
state's police power is the basis for public nuisance actions brought by
130 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 883, 885 (Pa.
1974) (finding that acid mine drainage discharging from mine constituted public nui-
sance and explaining that "[t]he absence of facts supporting concepts of negligence,
foreseeability or unlawful conduct is not in the least fatal to a finding of the existence
of a common law public nuisance").
131 Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 370.
132 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
133 Id. at 236.
134 Id. at 237. See also Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) ("[I]f the
health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the
proper party to represent and defend them.").
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a public entity. Public nuisance thus is quite distinct from private nui-
sance in its origins as well as in the scope of interests it seeks to pro-
tect.135 Acting as parens patriae, the state may bring public nuisance
actions to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.136 Second,
Tennessee Copper affirms the breadth of the power that the state can
effectuate through public nuisance actions. Rejecting the defendants'
argument that the harm to the state had to be balanced against the
economic benefit of the copper smelting operations, the Court char-
acterized the state's quasi-sovereign authority in these matters as virtu-
ally absolute:
Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more harm
than good to her own citizens is for her to determine. The possible
disaster to those outside the State must be accepted as a conse-
quence of her standing upon her extreme rights.137
Admittedly, the failure to undertake testing to determine health
and safety risks differs from the palpable harm of Tennessee Copper and
familiar examples of interferences with public health or comfort-
smoke, noise, and the like-that constituted public nuisances under
the common law. The modem understanding of "interference with
public rights," however, is broader than the limited conception of nui-
sance as a tangible harm or annoyance.138 First, public nuisance has
135 Cf People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997) ("Unlike the
private nuisance-tied to and designed to vindicate individual ownership interests in
land-the 'common' or public nuisance emerged from distinctly different historical
origins. The public nuisance doctrine is aimed at the protection and redress of com-
munity interests and, at least in theory, embodies a kind of collective ideal of civil life
which the courts have vindicated by equitable remedies since the beginning of the
16th century.").
136 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex reL Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600-07
(1982) (noting that parens patriae, literally meaning "parent of the country," refers to
authority of the state to litigate to defend quasi-sovereign interests, including health
and wellbeing of its residents).
137 Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 239. The Court recently reaffirmed these princi-
ples in Massachusetts v. EPA, a successful challenge by several states to EPA's refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 202 of the
Clean Air Act. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Discussing whether the
states had standing to sue, the Court cited Tennessee Copper for the proposition that
states have standing "to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests-
i.e., public or governmental interests that concern the state as a whole." Id. at 520
n.17. Although the Supreme Court has declined to set out an exhaustive definition of
quasi-sovereign interests, it has made clear that "a State has a quasi-sovereign interest
in the health and well-being-both physical and economic-of its residents in gen-
eral." Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607.
138 See Prosser, supra note 91, at 997 (noting that "[n] uisance is a French word
which means nothing more than harm").
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not been confined to situations where plaintiffs have suffered tangible
injury. Interference with the public peace, as by loud noises, and
interference with public morals, as in cases of prostitution, were rec-
ognized as public nuisances by the common law.13 9 Indeed, the Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts identifies five broad categories of public rights
subject to protection through a public nuisance action: "the public
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort [and]
the public convenience." 140 Not surprisingly, the mere risk of harm
has long been sufficient to establish a public nuisance,141 as demon-
strated by common law cases involving the keeping of diseased ani-
mals, the maintenance of a pond breeding malarial mosquitoes, and
the storage of explosives in the midst of a city.14 2 A state's quasi-sover-
eign interests "in the well-being of its populace"143 readily extend
beyond these situations and include protection against potential
injury from exposure to untested chemicals. 144
Untested chemicals do present a somewhat more complicated sit-
uation than the above-noted examples of public nuisance in that the
risk of injury is not established for individual substances. More specifi-
cally, while we have a sound basis for believing that untested sub-
stances collectively pose a significant threat to public health, there is
almost no way of knowing which individual chemicals do so without
testing-testing that the manufacturer is in the best position to per-
form. Absent testing, chemical manufacturers are imposing uncertain
risks on consumers and on the public at large. Although the law typi-
cally has not recognized such uncertainty as harm per se,14 5 the public
139 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. b (1979); e.g., Price v. State,
600 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (discussing common law prohibition on noise);
City of N.Y. ex rel. People v. Taliaferrow, 544 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275-76 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(discussing prostitution as a public nuisance).
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (a).
141 See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887) ("[Courts of equity] can not
only prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before irreparable mischief ensues,
but arrest or abate those in progress, and, by perpetual injunction, protect the public
against them in the future . . . ."); Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 374
("[T]he harm need not even be actual if the threat of harm is great enough.").
142 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B cmt. b.
143 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
144 Cf Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney Gen-
eral as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 57, 109
(2005) (listing examples of threats to public health, safety, and welfare where courts
have recognized states' authority to sue as parens patriae).
145 See Lin, supra note 3, at 975 (explaining that concept of harm reflects commu-
nity's normative judgments regarding significant setbacks to one's interests); see also
Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 970-73 (2003) (contending
that persons subjected to risks, even if no physical harm comes to pass, have neverthe-
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right to unpolluted air and water, which undoubtedly includes a right
to protect the public against exposure to substances known to be
harmful, also should encompass a right to protect the public against
exposure to untested substances. Such exposure is problematic not
only because of its potential to interfere with the public health and
the environment, but also because it runs afoul of principles of per-
sonal autonomy and valid consent.146 These principles, which are
implicated by matters involving "the integrity of [an] individual's own
projects and self-conception," particularly "the use made of one's own
body,"' 47 are denigrated whenever the public is exposed to untested
chemicals.148 Even absent proof of physical harm or causation, such
exposure deprives the public of its ability to choose whether or not to
be exposed to an untested product.'49
Application of public nuisance in these circumstances would be
consistent with the origins of public nuisance doctrine in the state's
less suffered harm); Glen 0. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tor-
tious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUn. 779, 783 (1985) (proposing liability based upon creation
of risk of injury).
146 See E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts: Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compen-
sable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous. L. REv. 781, 789 (1988) (con-
tending that "[t]he violation of a person's bodily autonomy. . . that occurs when one
is assaulted with a potentially hazardous chemical[ ] is . . . an injury that the law
should recognize and compensate"); Clifford Rechtschaffen, Advancing Environmental
justice Norms, 37 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 95, 112-13 (2003); see also Berger & Twerski, supra
note 23, at 259 (arguing for right of patients to informed choice about a drug's risks
and for enforceability of such right without having to prove that drug caused plain-
tiffs' harms).
147 Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 924 (1994).
148 See Berger & Twerski, supra note 23, at 273 ("[T]he denial of the right to
choose not to expose onself to an uncertain risk violates a very basic human right of
autonomous decisionmaking. . . ."); cf Cranor, supra note 25, at 283 ("Under post-
market laws the American citizenry are, in effect, human guinea pigs for the commer-
cial creations of American industry."). The importance of bodily autonomy is
reflected in its protection through individual torts such as assault and battery. Cf id.
at 300-01 ("Morally, citizens should regard invasion of their bodies without permis-
sion by humanly created substances as a trespass.").
149 Cf Berger & Twerski, supra note 23, at 274 ("If indeed there is a right to
informed choice, conditioning the right on proof that the harm was actually brought
about by the defendant's conduct makes no sense whatsoever. If an uncertain risk of
harm should have been communicated to the plaintiff so that the plaintiff could
assess whether she wished to play this game of russian roulette, to then say that the
plaintiff is not entitled to recovery because she cannot prove that the harm was actu-
ally caused by the suspect drug, renders the right to informed choice illusory.").
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police power.o50 The police power, commonly described as the power
to protect public health, safety, morals, and general welfare,15' com-
prehends the authority to enact legislation to prevent environmental
pollution and to abate public nuisances.15 2 This power is the "least
limitable" of all state powers and may be exercised broadly as long as
its exercise is not arbitrary.' 53 Although states generally have not
taken a precautionary approach to chemical regulation by requiring
proof of safety as a condition of manufacture or distribution,'15 4 there
is no doubt that the police power extends to the authority to regu-
late-and even prohibit-untested chemical substances that may be
harmful to public health or that may pollute the environment.'5 5
This understanding of the police power supports a recognition that
150 See Abrams & Washington, supra note 95, at 362 ("[A] uthority for an action in
public nuisance derived from what is now known as the sovereign's police power and
not from tort law."); Halper, supra note 89, at 10,296.
151 See, e.g., Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 317 (1907) (noting that police power
"embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the general
prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety"); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894) (explaining
that police power encompasses "everything essential to the public safety, health, and
morals").
152 See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960)
("Legislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly
falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously
known as the police power."); Lawton, 152 U.S. at 136; Exxon Mobil Corp. v. EPA, 217
F.3d 1246, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Air pollution prevention falls under the broad
police powers of the states, which include the power to protect the health of citizens
in the state. Environmental regulation traditionally has been a matter of state
authority.").
153 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915); Halper, supra note 89, at
10,296; Donna Jalbert Patalano, Police Power and the Public Trust: Prescriptive Zoning
Through the Conflation of Two Ancient Doctrines, 28 B.C. ENvrL. Ave. L. REv. 683, 708-09
(2001) (noting "elastic" nature of police power and stating that it "creates protections
for the public when individual interests need to yield to general social interests
because of social, economic, and political conditions").
154 See generally Lin, supra note 3, at 910-11 (observing that existing regulatory
schemes primarily involve regulation of demonstrated risks).
155 In Village ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the Supreme Court upheld the power of
local authorities to adopt zoning ordinances governing industrial facilities even
though such ordinances might exclude facilities that are "neither offensive nor dan-
gerous." 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). The Court explained:
But this is no more than happens in respect of many practice-forbidding laws
which this court has upheld although drawn in general terms so as to
include individual cases that may turn out to be innocuous in themselves.
The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will
not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity. Such laws may
also find their justification in the fact that, in some fields, the bad fades into
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exposure to untested substances constitutes an actionable interfer-
ence with public rights.
In order to constitute a public nuisance, an interference with
public rights generally must be substantial and unreasonable.15 6 At
first glance, the requirement of substantiality may appear to be a seri-
ous obstacle to asserting a public nuisance claim for the failure to test
chemical substances. By virtue of the very failure to test, substantial
physical harm usually cannot be shown.157 However, a showing of sub-
stantial harm is not strictly required where the state seeks only injunc-
tive relief, as opposed to damages.'15 In order to obtain an injunction
against a public nuisance, harm need only be threatened and need
not actually have been sustained at all.1 59 Moreover, the responsibility
of chemical manufacturers in perpetuating the condition of toxic
ignorance argues in favor of a shift in the burden of proving substanti-
ality (or the lack thereof) to chemical manufacturers.160
The third element of a public nuisance action, the requirement
that the defendant have control of the instrumentality causing the
nuisance, is easily satisfied where the nuisance involves a failure to
test. After all, the manufacturer is responsible for introducing the
chemical into the stream of commerce and has complete control over
whether testing is done. This situation is thus distinguishable from
the efforts to apply public nuisance doctrine in handgun and lead
paint litigation, where the instrumentalities causing the nuisance long
ago left the manufacturers' control and arguably became subject to
the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being
readily distinguished and separated in terms of legislation.
Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted). By analogy, the police power extends not only to
demonstrably harmful chemicals, but also to chemicals whose effects are currently
unknown and that ultimately may pose no health or environmental risks.
156 See supra Part II.A.
157 Three of the four factors suggested by Donald Gifford as relevant to determin-
ing the significance of interference with a public right, see supra text accompanying
note 116-the degree of harm, its duration, and its severity-will be difficult to
demonstrate because of the lack of safety testing.
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B cmt. i (1979) ("[F]or damages to
be awarded significant harm must have been actually incurred, while for an injunc-
tion harm need only be threatened and need not actually have been sustained at
all."); cf People v. McDonald, 137 Cal. App. 4th 521, 538 (2006) (citing Second Restate-
ment of Torts for proposition that "[a] public nuisance may be prosecuted criminally
although it has not yet resulted in any significant harm, or indeed any harm to
anyone").
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821B cmt. i.
160 Cf Wagner, supra note 5, at 1742 (advocating "that at least part of the burden
of resolving .. . uncertainty falls to the actors whose products and activities create the
uncertainty in the first place").
20101 985
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
superseding causes. 161 A company that releases untested substances
into the marketplace is analogous to a factory that releases smoke and
dust to the detriment of its neighbors, and is liable therefore under
nuisance theory. Moreover, although a few courts suggest that public
nuisance "has historically been tied to conduct on one's own land or
property as it affects the rights of the general public,"162 such a view
takes an overly narrow approach to public nuisance doctrine even
under common law precedents.163 Obstructions of public roads and
waterways could readily occur without any land ownership by the
defendant; indeed, the "catch-all criminal offense" of public nuisance
came to encompass such diverse circumstances as diversion of water
from a mill, unlicensed stage-plays, and indecent exposure.164 The
common element in these situations was not the presence of a real
property interest; rather control of the obstruction or source of the
nuisance sufficed. Such control is readily present when a chemical
manufacturer has failed to test the safety of its products.
161 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 501 (N.J. 2007); State v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 455 (R.I. 2008). In some of these cases, courts have
rejected public nuisance claims out of a concern that such suits could be used to
circumvent products liability law pertaining to defective products. See e.g., In re Lead
Paint, 924 A.2d at 503; Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 456. With respect to untested
chemicals, however, the allegation is not so much that the chemicals are defective, as
that manufacturers have failed to test for defects in the first instance.
162 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint, 924 A.2d at 495; see also Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at
452 ("[T]o date, the actions for [public] nuisance in this jurisdiction have been
related to land."); Gifford, supra note 88, at 832 (contending that "a finding of public
nuisance historically involved the use of land"). Gifford suggests that confining pub-
lic nuisance claims to cases involving land makes sense in light of the availability of
claims of negligence, strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, and strict
products liability for personal injuries resulting from conduct not involving the use of
land. See id. at 833. Public nuisance law, however, incorporates an element of fault
and thus cannot be strictly separated from the law of negligence or strict liability. See
supra note 98 and accompanying text. In addition, the availability of one cause of
action in specific factual circumstances does not necessarily preclude the availability
of another. Public nuisance's requirement of interference with a public right reduces
any concern that the tort might swallow up other torts and apply to "any unreasonable
harm that might result from human interaction." Gifford, supra note 88, at 833.
163 See 58 Am. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 31, at 592 (2002) ("[A]n action for public nui-
sance may lie even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the exercise
of private property rights."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 86, at 617-18 (5th ed. 1984) (distinguishing narrow civil action of private nuisance,
"narrowly restricted to the invasion of interests in the use or enjoyment of land," from
the "entirely separate" criminal action of public nuisance, "extending to virtually any
form of annoyance or inconvenience interfering with common public rights").
164 Keeton et al., supra note 163, § 86, at 617-18.
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Finally, applying public nuisance to the failure to test chemicals
raises two additional doctrinal issues. First, some jurisdictions require
intent, negligence, or a violation of law as an element of public nui-
sance. 165 Such a requirement would be readily met in failure to test
cases. By definition, a failure to test involves negligent conduct by a
chemical manufacturer: the failure to conduct reasonable health and
safety testing.166 Second, public nuisance claims would be asserted
under state common law, raising the possibility of federal preemption
under TSCA. That statute, however, expressly preserves "the authority
of any State ... to establish or continue in effect regulation of any
chemical substance, mixture, or article containing a chemical sub-
stance or mixture."
16 7
C. An Alternative Public Nuisance Theory Centered on the Right
to Information
Public nuisance theory also can be applied to the problem of unt-
ested chemicals under an understanding of "public right" that focuses
on harms to personal autonomy. Under this approach, the public
right that is interfered with is a procedural right, the right to informa-
tion, rather than the substantive right against exposure to untested
substances. This sort of interference represents a significant depar-
ture from the common law examples of public nuisance, but it still
falls within public nuisance's broad definition. While the public right
to information regarding environmental hazards is a fairly modern
concept, it is one that has received growing recognition in recent
years. 168
The adoption of various statutes promoting the dissemination of
information about chemical hazards to the public reflects the develop-
ment of this right. At the federal level, the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Actl 6 9 (EPCRA) requires facilities to report
annually their releases of chemicals that have been listed as toxic by
165 See supra note 98.
166 The specific measures necessary to satisfy the duty to conduct reasonable test-
ing are considered in Part III of this Article.
167 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (1) (2006). The exceptions to this statutory section pro-
vide for preemption where EPA issues a rule mandating testing or otherwise regulat-
ing a specific chemical substance. See id. § 2617(a) (2). In such circumstances, a state
would have no need to bring a public nuisance action for failure to test.
168 Cf Gary E.R. Hook & George W. Lucier, The Right to Know is for Everyone, 108
ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. A160, A160 (2000) (editorial) (noting origins of right to know
and arguing that "[i]n a free and open society, the concept of 'right to know' seems
fundamental").
169 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001-11,050 (2006).
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Congress.170 As required by statute, EPA gathers the data in the Tox-
ics Release Inventory and makes it available to the public. 171 The Safe
Drinking Water Act172 requires community water systems to send each
customer an annual report on the level of contaminants in the drink-
ing water purveyed by the system and to notify customers of certain
violations of the act.173 In the workplace, the Occupational Safety and
Health Act17 4 requires that employees be "apprised of all hazards to
which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and appropriate emer-
gency treatment, and proper conditions and precautions of safe use
or exposure." 75 In the consumer marketplace, federal statutes and
regulations mandate ingredient and nutrition labeling on processed
foods, as well as risk labels on pharmaceuticals. 176 And at the state
level, a number of similar measures have been enacted, the most well
known of which is California's Proposition 65.177 Passed by popular
initiative, this statute requires businesses to warn consumers of prod-
ucts that contain listed carcinogens or reproductive toxins.178 Many
of the above statutes contain provisions authorizing citizen enforce-
ment for failure to disclose the required information.179
170 See id. § 11,023. EPCRA also requires facilities to provide information to state
and local emergency planning groups regarding the quantities of certain hazardous
chemicals on site. See id. §§ 11,002(c), 11,022. The public can obtain much of this
information upon request. See id. § 11,021(c) (2) (public request for material safety
data sheets); id. § 11,022(e) (3) (public request for emergency and hazardous chemi-
cal inventory forms); id. § 11,044(a) (public availability of plans, data sheets, forms,
and notices).
171 See id. § 11,023(j).
172 Pub. L. No. 95-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300f-300j-26 (2006)).
173 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(c) (1), (4).
174 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (2006)).
175 See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (7); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2009) (OSHA hazard com-
munication regulation).
176 See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535,
104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended primarily at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006)); 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.57 (2008) (labeling requirements for prescription drugs).
177 See John D. Echeverria & Julie B. Kaplan, Poisonous Procedural "Reform": In
Defense of Environmental Right-to-Know, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 585 (2003).
178 CAL.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25,249.6 ("No person in the course of doing
business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to a chemical known
to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear and
reasonable warning . . . .").
179 See 42 U.S.C. § 11,046(a)(1) (authority under EPCRA to bring citizen suits
against facility owner or operator for failure to submit information); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25,249.7(d) (authorizing suits "by any person in the public interest"
for Proposition 65 violations if certain conditions met). The failure to provide envi-
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Furthermore, a right of access to environmental information,
including toxicity data, is arguably an emerging principle of interna-
tional law. Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development discusses this point:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning
the environment that is held by public authorities, including informa-
tion on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by mak-
ing information widely available. 18 0
Although Principle 10 hardly establishes an enforceable right to such
information, it does reflect a recognition of the importance of "infor-
mation on hazardous materials" to human wellbeing and the role of
governments in developing and disseminating that information.
The "right-to-know" laws discussed above, as well as Principle 10,
share a common rationale of promoting individual autonomy by facili-
tating the ability of individuals to make choices about the risks to
which they are exposed.s1 8 The right to know and the right not to be
ronmental risk information that an individual would consider in deciding whether to
engage in an activity may be sufficient to establish Article III standing in at least some
circumstances. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass'n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm'n,
389 F.3d 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding organization had standing to sue for infor-
mational injury of members arising out of defendant's failure to fulfill monitoring
and reporting requirements of Clean Water Act permit, where member attested that
lack of information "deprived him of the ability to make choices about whether it was
'safe to fish, paddle, and recreate in this waterway'").
180 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/
5/Rev. 1. (June 14, 1992) (emphasis added).
181 See Kathryn E. Durham-Hammer, Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, Reforming, and
Implementing the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 29
CoLum. J. ENvrL. L. 323, 333 (2004) (describing "creat[ion of] a statutory right-to-
know that affords community members an opportunity to make informed decisions
about how to respond to environmental risks in their neighborhoods" as one of the
primary objectives of EPCRA); Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 177, at 590; McGarity
& Shapiro, supra note 27, at 844 ("Members of the public have a legitimate interest in
knowing the full health effects of products which receive agency approval so that they
can decide for themselves whether to use them."); Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warn-
ing Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California's Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303,
314 (1996). In practice, mandatory information disclosure requirements have
prompted companies to reduce their emissions or reformulate their products volunta-
rily. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Per-
formance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 287 (2001);
Rechtschaffen, supra, at 341-47.
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exposed to untested substances thus are two sides of the same coin,
both safeguarding individual autonomy. The development and disclo-
sure of risk information enable individuals to protect their self-inter-
ests and to defend themselves and their families from external
threats.182 Information disclosure is also critical to democratic deci-
sionmaking, as only an informed citizenry can participate effectively
in the political process and make considered judgments.'83 Ulti-
mately, information disclosure requirements reflect a public desire to
hold manufacturers responsible for the effects of their products and
suggest the existence of an enforceable public right to be informed. 184
While this right touches both individual and collective interests, it
should be considered a public right because the injury-the lack of
information-is shared equally by all members of the public and is
supportive of the public right to an unpolluted environment. Moreo-
ver, access to accurate information, like access to unobstructed high-
ways, is essential to healthy open markets.
D. Litigating Public Nuisance for Failure to Test
A public nuisance cause of action to enforce chemical manufac-
turers' and importers' duty to test is attractive for a number of rea-
sons. First, it would make the duty to test a meaningful obligation. A
cause of action as delineated in this Article would be available upon
the introduction of an untested substance into the stream of com-
182 See Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 177, at 590; Timothy William Lambert et
al., Ethical Perspectives for Public and Environmental Health: Fostering Autonomy and the
Right to Know, 111 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. 133, 135 (2003) ("Fostering understanding
enables people to think and care for themselves and also to help in the preventive
action by assisting other people to stay out of harm's way . . . .").
183 See Echeverria & Kaplan, supra note 177, at 590; Rechtschaffen, supra note 181,
at 313-15 (noting contentions that right-to-know laws promote economic efficiency
and democratic decisionmaking).
184 Cf Wagner, supra note 26, at 808-09 ("The legislative history undergirding at
least some of the right-to-know laws also supports an inference that the public expects
manufacturers to bear responsibility for generating and providing basic information
on potentially toxic products and by-products."). The right of citizens to know of the
hazards posed by chemicals in the environment around them is analogous to the right
of a patient to informed consent under medical malpractice law. See Berger & Twer-
ski, supra note 23, at 270-73 (discussing informed consent paradigm). In the latter
context, Professors Berger and Twerski have argued that an injured patient who is
deprived of information about the risks associated with the use of a drug should have
a cause of action even if she is unable to prove that the drug caused her injury. See id.
at 259 (describing proposal, which would apply to drugs that are not medically neces-
sary). Causation not only is impossible for many such plaintiffs to prove, but also is
largely beside the point: the patient's right of informed consent was violated at the
time of nondisclosure. See id. at 272-74.
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merce. We would not have to wait for physical injury before trying to
enforce the duty, and causation-a formidable barrier to the filing of
toxic tort claims, let alone their successful prosecution-would not be
at issue. Second, such a cause of action would enable a measured
public response to a public problem.185 Because individual members
of the public would suffer from virtually the same injury, potential
private plaintiffs would not be able to assert the special injury neces-
sary to sue. Rather, only public entities would be able to bring failure-
to-test claims under a public nuisance theory. 186 This limitation on
the pool of potential plaintiffs would ameliorate concerns that manu-
facturers would be inundated by lawsuits. And because of limited
public resources, state attorneys general would need to be selective in
deciding what cases to pursue and which companies to name as
defendants.18 7 Third, the relief granted would directly redress the
problem. Although damages are sometimes recoverable in public nui-
sance actions, the most common remedy is injunctive relief.'88 This
general rule would hold true for failure-to-test claims as well. Injunc-
tive relief would be preferable to damages because of the difficulty of
determining the economic value of the information not developed.
In addition, to the extent that damages might in theory compensate
for tangible injuries, it is improbable that plaintiffs would be able to
demonstrate injuries caused by exposure to as-yet untested substances.
Ultimately, injunctions ordering companies to perform testing in
order to manufacture or distribute a chemical within a state would be
a particularly appropriate remedy, and courts could tailor compliance
deadlines to account for individual circumstances, such as the contin-
185 See Antolini & Rechtschaffen, supra note 92, at 10,119 (noting that public nui-
sance "offers a community-oriented remedy").
186 Cf Sara Zdeb, Note, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to Massachusetts v.
EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1077
(2008) (describing purpose of parens patriae doctrine as "to allow states to vindicate
public rights and guard against injuries that might be too widely-shared to support
standing for any particular individual").
187 See Calvin Massey, State Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 61 FLA. L. REv. 249,
274 (2009) (contending political processes and limited resources constrain ability of
state attorneys general to litigate public rights). Public nuisance actions seeking
injunctions to redress a failure to test can be contrasted with product liability actions,
which seek to recover damages for past or existing private injuries. See Zoglin, supra
note 93, at 364 (discussing court decision allowing representative public nuisance
cause of action for future abatement and distinguishing products liability actions); cf
City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002) (hold-
ing that existence of facts suggestive of products liability claim does not preclude
public nuisance claim if product unreasonably interferes with public right).
188 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
20101 991
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ued distribution of useful or important chemicals for a period of time
adequate to allow for testing.
In order to bring public nuisance claims for failure to test, a state
would first have to ascertain whether any testing has been done on a
particular chemical. Although TSCA has been of limited value in gen-
erating toxicity data,189 it can play an important role in revealing what,
if any, testing has been conducted. First, the requirement of TSCA
section 5 that companies provide EPA with notice of new chemicals
and significant new uses of existing chemicals provides a useful start-
ing point.190 In these notices, companies must submit health data in
their control and a description of other toxicity data of which they are
aware.191 Second, section 8 of TSCA imposes additional disclosure
requirements. Section 8(d) requires manufacturers, importers, and
processors of chemicals to submit unpublished health and safety stud-
ies in their possession, as well as lists of other studies known to them
but not in their possession.192 Moreover, if manufacturers, proces-
sors, or distributors of a substance obtain information that reasonably
supports the conclusion that the substance presents a substantial risk
of injury to health or the environment, section 8(e) requires that
information to be provided to EPA. 193 The section 8(d) obligation
applies only to chemicals that have been specifically listed by EPA,194
whereas section 8(e) is a self-implementing requirement that applies
on a continuing basis to all chemicals.195
189 See supra Part I.D.
190 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006).
191 See supra Part I.D.1.
192 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d) (2006); see BROWN ET AL., supra note 64, at 65-67. Indus-
try compliance with this provision is mixed. SeeJames W. ConradJr., Open Secrets: The
Widespread Availability of Information About the Health and Environmental Effects of Chemi-
cals, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2006, at 141, 144 (noting EPA has required
reporting of specific information for approximately 1100 chemicals, and submission
of health and safety studies for approximately 1000 chemicals); Wagner, supra note
55, at 698-99 & n.15.
193 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e); see also TSCA Section 8(e) (requiring notice); Notification
of Substantial Risk; Policy Clarification and Reporting Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,129
(June 3, 2003) (providing notice of EPA's interpretation and enforcement policy of
TSCA section 8(3)); Conrad, supra note 192, at 145 (stating EPA has received over
15,000 submissions under § 8(e) since 1977). EPA also accepts "FYI Submissions"-
toxicity information voluntarily submitted by companies, organizations, or citizens.
See Envtl. Protection Agency, Toxic Substance Control Act Section 8(e) Notices,
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/tsca8e/pubs/basicinformation.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2009).
194 40 C.F.R. § 716.10 (2009); id. § 716.120 (listing substances to which § 8(d)
health and safety data reporting requirements apply).
195 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 64, at 67.
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States should be able to obtain most of the health and safety data
submitted to EPA pursuant to TSCA or otherwise within the agency's
possession. Some of this information is publicly available. Section
8(e) notices, for instance, are posted on the web.' 96 Toxicity data on
a somewhat limited set of substances can also be found online in
EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) ,197 in toxicological
profiles maintained by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry,198 and in other databases.'99 Other information in EPA's
possession can be obtained through a Freedom of Information Act
request.200 Although companies often make broad claims that the
information they submit to EPA constitutes confidential business
information (CBI) that should not be disclosed to the public,201 such
claims generally should not apply to toxicity information. TSCA
explicitly provides, for instance, that CBI protections do not apply to
health and safety data submitted to the government under the stat-
196 See Envtl. Protection Agency, 8(e) Notices and FYI Submissions, http://
www.epa.gov/oppt/tsca8e/pubs/8eandfyisubmissions.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2009).
197 IRIS is a publicly accessible database that contains information on human
health effects that may result from exposure to various substances in the environ-
ment, including a summary of toxicity data. See Envtl. Protection Agency, Integrated
Risk Information System (IRIS), http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris/index.cfm (last vis-
ited Dec. 5, 2009); see also Lin, supra note 15, at 1491 (noting that IRIS is a limited
database that "summarizes the EPA's consensus position on the potential adverse
effects of over 500 chemicals").
198 ATSDR prepares toxicological profiles for 275 listed substances; each profile
includes a discussion of health effects based on a review of known research. See
Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, Toxicological Profile Information
Sheet, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2009); see also Lin,
supra note 15, at 1491 (noting that EPA and ATSDR prioritize the chemicals to be
profiled based on the "frequency of occurrence at toxic waste sites, toxicity, and
potential for human exposure").
199 Canada is developing chemical toxicity profiles, as mandated by the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act of 1999. See Health Canada, Environmental and Work-
place Health, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ewh-semt/contaminants/existsub/index-eng.
php (last visited Dec. 5, 2009). Similar data will become available as the REACH
program is implemented in Europe. See infra Part II.E.2. Legislation enacted by Cali-
fornia in September 2008 requires the state to develop a "Toxics Information
Clearinghouse" that would collect and distribute environmental and toxicological
data on chemicals. See Act of Sept. 29, 2008, 2008 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 560 (S.B. 509)
(West).
200 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
201 SeeJulie Yang, Note, Confidential Business Information Reform Under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 2 ENvrt. LAw. 219, 222 (1995); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (2006)
(prohibiting government disclosure of confidential business information, with some
exceptions).
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ute. 2 0 2 The various measures discussed above can help a state to get a
sense of what testing has been done, but to complete the picture,
direct requests for information-or perhaps even legislation that com-
pels companies to disclose testing efforts and data-may also be
necessary.
E. Other Proposa&
Several commentators have proposed other means of addressing
chemical manufacturers' failure to test their products. In this section,
I briefly compare the leading proposals with the public nuisance
approach advocated here. This comparison suggests several advan-
tages to a public nuisance approach, including its simplicity and rela-
tively flexible application.
1. Liability Without Causation
One way to address the failure to test would be to impose toxic
tort liability without proof of causation. Under one such proposal by
Margaret Berger, an injured plaintiff who demonstrates that a chemi-
cal manufacturer failed to develop or disseminate information needed
to assess latent risks would be entitled to recovery, unless the manufac-
turer can demonstrate that its product did not cause the plaintiffs
injury. 2 03 The proposal, in other words, creates a presumption of cau-
sation and shifts the burden of disproving causation to the
defendant. 204
202 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(a) (3) (2009) (defining health
and safety data); Conrad, supra note 192, at 146 (contending that "TSCA does not
provide business confidentiality protection to health and safety studies"). To the
extent that such data constitute CBI, states have sometimes been able to access TSCA
CBI data through agreements with EPA and industry. See Yang, supra note 201, at
232.
203 Berger, supra note 18, at 2143-44. Under a negligence regime, defendants
who meet the requisite standard of care for toxicity testing would not be liable for
injuries caused by their products. Id. at 2143.
204 Id. at 2144-45 (allowing manufacturers to raise defenses "that certain adverse
health reactions could not plausibly arise from exposure to defendant's product" or
"that a particular plaintiffs injury is attributable . . . to another cause"). In a similar
proposal by Wendy Wagner, plaintiffs would be required to prove the following ele-
ments to establish a prima facie case: inadequate testing; foreseeable exposure; and
"serious harm that might be causally linked to exposure to the product." Wagner,
supra note 26, at 834-35; see also Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass
Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1, 45 (1995) (suggesting burden of proof be shifted
whenever plaintiff can establish uncertainty such that it is not possible to conclude
whether substance is safe or harmful to humans).
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Berger contends that eliminating causation and focusing instead
on the failure to develop information creates better incentives for
investigating risk.20 5 The proposal, like the approach set out in this
Article, comprehends toxic ignorance as the root of the problem.
Given the lack of toxicity information, eliminating causation improves
the prospect of holding defendants liable for morally irresponsible
choices.206 Berger also suggests that causation does little to further
the corrective justice goals of tort law in toxic tort cases and therefore
that little is lost by eliminating it as a requirement for recovery.207
Unlike run-of-the-mill tort cases, where causation serves to "'singl[e]
out this plaintiff from the class of persons whom the defendant has
endangered,"' 208 the heavy reliance on epidemiological data and sta-
tistical probabilities to infer causation 209 in toxic tort cases under-
mines the notion that causation has singled out the correct plaintiff
and the correct defendant.210
Imposing liability without causation would put some pressure on
manufacturers to carry out testing and would enable more toxic tort
victims to bring successful claims. But the latent harm that frequently
characterizes toxic exposure would still create insurmountable diffi-
culties in many cases. Although they would be relieved of the formal
burden of proving specific causation, plaintiffs, in order to determine
whom they should file a complaint against, would still have to link
their injury to a particular defendant or group of defendants; this
showing would essentially involve a watered-down version of general
causation. 211 On the one hand, such a showing could be quite prob-
lematic given our daily exposure to hundreds of chemicals and the
lack of testing for many of those chemicals. On the other hand, if
courts interpret this requirement leniently, such that any plausible
link between exposure and injury might do, the pool of potential
plaintiffs-and number of potential trials-could become unmanage-
205 Berger, supra note 18, at 2134.
206 See id. at 2132-33.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 2132 (quoting ErnestJ. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 407, 410 (1987)).
209 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1449-50.
210 See Berger, supra note 18, at 2132-33, 2120-26.
211 Berger's proposal intends to relieve plaintiffs of having to prove general causa-
tion. Id. at 2145. However, the proposal's requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate
exposure and ill health subsequent to such exposure indicates that plaintiffs would
still have to draw a link between the two. See id. at 2144; cf Wagner, supra note 26, at
835 (requiring that plaintiffs show "serious harm that might be causally linked to
exposure to the product").
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able. 2 12 Overwhelming liability could be the result, as companies una-
ble to satisfy their duties are compelled to pay potentially speculative
damage amounts. 2 13
The proposal set forth in this Article avoids many of the difficul-
ties of Berger's proposal by taking an ex ante approach. Rather than
concerning itself with the recovery of damages, the proposal aims to
avoid damages in the first instance by mandating reasonable testing of
chemicals before and after they enter the stream of commerce. 214
This focus on the breach of the duty to test sidesteps the difficulties
involved in demonstrating causation (albeit in a watered-down ver-
sion). Unlike Berger's scheme, the instant proposal does not require
a plaintiff to identify plausible defendants, nor does it risk casting too
wide a net that could impose formidable burdens of liability on an
entire industry. Indeed, the proposal guards against potential abuse
by offering only injunctive relief and by limiting drastically the pool of
possible plaintiffs. The instant proposal thus provides a measured but
effective response to the toxic ignorance problem.
2. Statutory Reform
Other proposals, rather than relying on the tort system, involve
statutory reform. As various commentators have contended, statutory
enactments generally possess greater democratic legitimacy than regu-
latory obligations imposed through parens patriae suits. 21 5 Statutory
reform allows a directly accountable political body to consider com-
plex problems, weigh competing interests, and set priorities through a
relatively public process.216 Public nuisance litigation brought by state
attorneys general, in contrast, can effectively supplant legislative deci-
sions with detailed decrees proposed by executive branch officials and
imposed by an unelected judiciary. 217 The possibility of such litiga-
212 See Pierce, supra note 19, at 1313-18, 1325.
213 See Kim, supra note 4, at 556.
214 See supra Parts II.B-D.
215 See Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 915, 918, 962 (2008); see also
Wagner, supra note 55, at 694 (noting criticisms of "'regulation through litigation"' as
"an illegitimate end-run around the political process rather than a supplemental insti-
tutional mechanism for making products safer").
216 See Gifford, supra note 215, at 962-64; W. Kip Viscusi, Overview, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 1, 1 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002) ("The policies that result from
litigation almost invariably involve less public input and accountability than govern-
ment regulation.").
217 See Gifford, supra note 215, at 919. Gifford cites the regulatory scheme created
through the settlement of tobacco litigation brought by various states as a prime
example of how "[s]tate attorneys general and mass products plaintiffs' attorneys
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tion, however, also may counter inertial tendencies of government
actors in implementing statutory programs.218
One statutory proposal would set up a "super study" chemical
research program patterned after the Superfund program for clean-
ing up hazardous waste sites.219 Under this proposal, a federal plan
would govern research by private and public institutions, which would
be reimbursed for research costs from a general fund supported by
taxes on the chemical industry.220 Individual chemical producers
would be required to reimburse the fund when studies show adverse
health effects from their chemicals. 221 The proposal would allow an
agency to identify research priorities and coordinate research efforts
while holding the chemical industry responsible for the costs of that
research.222 As noted earlier, however, chemical manufacturers them-
selves are generally in the best position to conduct safety testing
because of their familiarity with their products and superior access to
information. 223 In addition, the proposal would likely face serious
obstacles to enactment, particularly in light of the substantial eco-
nomic burdens it would place on industry, as well as its similarities to
the unpopular Superfund statute. 224
Another proposed reform would directly require manufacturers
to generate a standardized set of information through safety
research. 225 Spelling out the data collection procedures to be fol-
lowed and the information to be produced would help prevent manu-
facturers from manipulating testing efforts or results.226 A one-size-
fits-all approach to testing, however, may be wasteful in some circum-
stances and inadequate in others. Where standardized information
ended up playing the regulatory roles traditionally handled by Congress, state legisla-
tures, [and regulatory agencies]." Id. at 924-25. But cf PhilipJ. Cook &Jens Ludwig,
Litigation as Regulation: Firearms, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 216,
at 67, 91 (suggesting public lawsuits against gun manufacturers are not undemocratic
because they are more likely to influence rather than replace legislative process).
218 See William W. Buzbee, Interaction's Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regula-
tion, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 155 n.34 (2007).
219 See Lyndon, supra note 30, at 1837.
220 See id. at 1837-38.
221 See id. at 1837.
222 See id. at 1837-38.
223 See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
224 See, e.g., Lori A. Kosakowski, Note, The Inclusion of Passive Migration Under CER-
CLA Liability: When Is "Disposal" Truly Disposal?, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 293, 299 (2002)
(noting criticisms of CERCLA as "'excessively stringent and costly'" and "as an ineffi-
cient program plagued by high transaction costs and long delays" (quoting ALFRED R.
LIGHT, CERCLA LAw AND PROCEDURE COMPENDIUM, at 1-1 (1992)).
225 See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 5, at 1738-40.
226 See id. at 1739.
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production requirements are difficult to devise-as may well be the
case for chemical substances in general-the proposal calls for a pre-
cautionary approach in which chemicals are presumed to be harmful
until manufacturers produce sufficient evidence to the contrary. 227
Such an approach could be implemented through a comprehensive
regulatory scheme that imposes premarketing, registration, and/or
approval requirements on all chemicals. 228
The European Union adopted one such approach in 2006: the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH) program.229 REACH requires the registration of all chemi-
cals, including those with a long history of use, over an eleven-year
phase-in period. 23 0 In the registration process, manufacturers and
importers are to submit a technical dossier containing information on
each chemical's properties and uses, as well as guidance on safe
use.231 For chemicals produced in quantities over ten metric tons,
companies must also prepare a chemical safety assessment, which doc-
uments health and environmental hazards and analyzes whether the
substance is persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic. 232 While a
detailed consideration of the merits of REACH is beyond the scope of
this Article, a similarly comprehensive approach would offer signifi-
cant benefits over TSCA in terms of generating toxicity data.2 33
227 See id. at 1741-42.
228 See Cranor, supra note 25, at 296-97, 304-10 (proposing manufacturers be
required to show that chemicals do not pose risks of harm to developing children
before products enter commerce).
229 Council Regulation 1907/2006, Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396) (EC).
230 Id. arts. 6-7, at 62-66; see also Applegate, supra note 5, at 1390-91 (comparing
TSCA and REACH). The registration requirement applies to each substance manu-
factured or imported in quantities of one ton or more per year, with the exception of
substances regulated under other legislation, naturally occurring substances such as
minerals, and substances known to present low risks. REACH art. 6, at 62; id. art. 7, at
63-65; id. art. 23, at 94-95 (phase-in dates); id. art. 2, at 48-53 (applicability of
provisions).
231 REACH art. 10, at 70.
232 Id. art. 14, at 77-79. For more details regarding the preparation of a chemical
safety assessment, see EUROPEAN CHEMS. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON INFORMATION REQUIRE-
MENTS AND CHEMICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT, at Part A (2008), available at http://gui-
dance.echa.europa.eu/docs/guidancedocument/information-requirements-part
a_en.pdf?vers=20_08_08.
233 See Applegate, supra note 5, at 1391 (noting registration requirement of
REACH "should increase the supply of data well above the TSCA baseline"); Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental
Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1409, 1433 (2008) (explaining that REACH not only cre-
ates legal mandate to produce information, but also removes incentives "toward will-
ful blindness or strategic nonproduction or nondisclosure of relevant information");
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Implementation of a comprehensive scheme like REACH in the
United States would give manufacturers greater incentives to do basic
toxicity research. Significant government resources would be
required, however, to develop such a scheme and to process the infor-
mation submitted. 234 In addition, a REACH-like regime would face
formidable political barriers to enactment. 235 The inability of Con-
gress to make meaningful changes to TSCA, despite widespread recog-
nition of its shortcomings, suggests the unlikelihood of statutory
reform in this area in the near future.236 Recent episodes of contami-
nated consumer products and growing concerns about endocrine dis-
ruptors may generate legislation responding to specific concerns,237
but the broader problem of untested chemicals presents a more
abstract issue that is less likely to generate public support or legislative
attention.238 Unless or until a comprehensive scheme akin to REACH
is put in place, public nuisance actions can offer states the opportu-
nity to target chemicals that may warrant testing because of their wide-
spread use, persistent nature, observed effects, or other reasons for
concern. Indeed, REACH itself may facilitate such actions, as well as
other tort and regulatory efforts in the United States, by generating
toxicity data that might suggest the need for further investigation. 239
Public nuisance actions not only can target individual chemicals for
testing, but their case-specific approach also allows testing require-
ments to be tailored to fit specific situations. Ultimately, public nui-
sance actions might even facilitate the enactment of comprehensive
cf Cranor, supra note 25, at 310 (describing REACH as "splendidly simple" in that it
bars access to EU market if there is no safety data).
234 See Karkkainen, supra note 233, at 1434.
235 See Wagner, supra note 10, at 639.
236 See id. ("Washington insiders seem to concede that meaningful reform of
TSCA is not in the cards; the industry's fortified resistance is simply an insuperable
obstacle to any meaningful amendments to increase testing or lower the EPA's bur-
den to impose regulatory restrictions on toxic products.").
237 See, e.g., Lyndsey Layton, Study Links Chemical BPA to Health Problems, WASH.
POST, Sept. 17, 2008, at A3; Jim Yardley & David Barboza, Despite Warnings, China's
Regulators Failed to Stop Tainted Milk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2008, at Al.
238 See Wagner, supra note 10, at 639 (concluding TSCA reform to be especially
unlikely because "the public is simply not engaged or attuned to these abstract,
futuristic worries"); see also Wagner, supra note 55, at 720 ("When the only rallying call
is the deficiency of safety information, it is difficult to catalyze others to participate in
the political process . . . .").
239 See Karkkainen, supra note 233, at 1434 (contending that REACH will
"facilitat[e] self-help actions to identify and implement safe uses" and could
"prompt[ ] EPA to exercise its authority under TSCA to demand further testing of
substances deemed harmful by the EU").
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testing requirements by encouraging industries to support a more pre-
dictable alternative to common law litigation.240
III. WHAT MIGHT A DUTY To TEST REQUIRE?
The discussion thus far has assumed the existence of a duty to test
chemicals for toxicity without specifying in detail what that duty might
require. Public nuisance actions to enforce that duty will require
courts to grapple with its contents. In this Part, I explain how the
general duty to test may be translated into concrete and specific
requirements. In enforcing the duty to test, courts will have to gain a
basic familiarity with toxicity testing methods. This is a manageable
task comparable to what courts normally do, and does not demand
that courts develop the technical expertise a regulatory agency might
possess or to conduct activities better suited to the legislature. 241 After
providing a general overview of toxicity testing methods, including in
vitro, in vivo, and epidemiological studies, I suggest that courts focus
on in vitro and in vivo options for purposes of determining what sort
of testing may be sufficient in a specific case.
A. Toxicity Testing Methods in General
A primary objective of toxicity testing is to determine the possible
hazards associated with exposure to a chemical substance and to char-
acterize the risk in a qualitative or quantitative manner.242 Important
240 Cf Alice Kaswan, The Domestic Response to Global Climate Change: What Role for
Federal, State, and Litigation Initiatives?, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 39, 100 (2007) (making simi-
lar argument with respect to climate change litigation); Timothy D. Lytton, Using Tort
Litigation to Enhance Regulatory Policy Making: Evaluating Climate-Change Litigation in
Light of Lessons from Gun-Industry and Clergy-Sexual-Abuse Lawsuits, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1837,
1837 (2008) (describing various ways in which litigation influences policymaking);
Wagner, supra note 55, at 711-27 (discussing examples of how regulatory litigation
succeeded in overcoming suppression of adverse information about defendants'
products where regulators failed to access or act on this information).
241 In contrast to public nuisance litigation in the context of global warming, in
which a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs might require courts to develop a complex
regulatory regime, see, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265,
272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated and remanded 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (listing "tran-
scendently legislative" tasks that court would have to accomplish in order to grant
relief in global warming litigation), a public nuisance action for failure to test would
simply require courts, in designing the appropriate relief, to determine whether more
testing is necessary and to set a testing schedule.
242 See FRANK A. BARILE, PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY TESTING 5-6 (2008); ROBINSoN
& THORN, supra note 69, at 1-2; see also Paul Illing, General Overview of the Safety Evalua-
tion of Chemicals, in ALTERNATIVES To AIMAL TESTING, supra note 70, at 1, 4-5 (defin-
ing risk assessment and distinguishing "hazard" from "risk").
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variables involved in this overall assessment are exposure routes and
exposure levels. 2 4 3 As a general matter, testing seeks to uncover both
acute toxicity-adverse health effects that follow a single or limited
number of exposures to a substance-as well as chronic toxicity-
effects resulting from continuous or intermittent exposure over
extended periods of time.24 4
Broadly speaking, toxicity testing methods can be broken down
into three main categories: in vitro testing, in vivo testing, and epide-
miological studies.245 In vitro refers to any testing done outside of a
living organism using plastic or glass.2 46 This plastic or glass forms an
artificial system in which cells or tissues from humans or animals are
cultured according to established methodologies. 247 In vivo testing
occurs inside a living organism. 248 The term usually refers to animal
studies conducted in a laboratory or other controlled environment,
but also includes human experimentation. 249 Finally, epidemiological
studies examine the relationship, if any, between exposure and effect
in a population-for example, whether people become ill as a result
of inhaling an accidentally released chemical.2 5 0  Epidemiological
243 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 15. Exposure levels-the concentration of a sub-
stance at the border of an organism-do not necessarily correspond with absorption
levels-the amount of a substance that is found in a particular biological system
within an organism. See Diether Neubert, Risk Assessment and Preventive Hazard Mini-
mization, in ToxiCOLOGY 1153, 1162-63 (Hans Marquardt et al. eds., 1999).
244 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 89-90; ROBINsON & THORN, supra note 69, at 3.
Generally, chronic toxicity of a particular compound cannot be predicted based on its
acute toxicity, or vice versa. See id. at 3.
245 See Illing, supra note 242, at 15 (listing types of hazard information); Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 301, 321-28 (1992) (discussing three categories of data used to determine safety
of Bendectin).
246 "In vitro" translates from Latin to literally mean "in glass." WEBSTER'S THIRD
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1986) (defining term "in vitro" as outside the living
body and in an artificial environment).
247 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 147, 151-73.
248 "In vivo" translates from Latin to mean "in the living." WEBSTER'S THIRD INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 246, at 1190 (defining term "in vivo" as "in the living
body of a plant or animal").
249 See Illing, supra note 242, at 16 ("In vivo toxicity studies are studies carried out
in animals or humans. Although the best species for studying effects in humans is
humans, ethical considerations limit the type and amount. . . ." (footnote omitted)).
250 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1448-49: Epidemiological studies can involve other
parameters. For example, epidemiologists can use a randomized clinical trial to eval-
uate new drugs, efficacy of surgical treatments, and screening programs. See LEON
GORDIs, EPIDEMIOLOGY 115-29 (3d ed. 2004).
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studies alone do not prove causation, however; rather, they reveal cor-
relations between exposure and disease. 25 1
Courts tend to view epidemiological studies as the most persua-
sive and acceptable type of general causation evidence in toxic tort
cases because they examine disease rates in human populations.252
Epidemiological studies are also critical to clinical practice. Clinical
trials involving humans, however, are not a viable option for determin-
ing the toxicity of chemicals ex ante because of the ethical and practi-
cal difficulties of human experimentation. 253 And epidemiological
studies often may not be helpful or even possible ex post because of
the absence of data and the limited ability of such studies to detect
chronic risks and small increases in risks.2 5 4 Given these difficulties,
courts should focus on in vitro and in vivo options for purposes of
establishing what sort of toxicity testing is sufficient. The following
section examines these two options in detail.
B. In Vitro and In Vivo Testing
1. In Vitro Methods
Determining the potential toxic hazards associated with a sub-
stance begins with basic testing to identify its physical and chemical
properties.25 5 This data, which can shed light on the nature of the
substance and the probability of its release, includes, but is not limited
to, molecular structure, boiling point, melting point, water solubility,
impurities, and general reactivity.256 TSCA requires that some-but
not all-of this information be submitted to EPA for all new chemi-
cals.25 7 Although this information is insufficient to determine the
251 See Neubert, supra note 243, at 1165 ("It is one principle of epidemiology that
such single studies do not allow us to prove a causal relationship.").
252 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1448.
253 See MARK E. STELLJEs, TOXICOLOGY FOR NONTOXICOLOGISTs 70 (2d ed. 2008).
254 See Lin, supra note 15, at 1449.
255 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 15, 59; Horst Spielmann & Alan M. Goldberg, In
Vitro Methods, in TOXICOLOGY, supra note 243, at 1131, 1135 ("[Alcute toxicity testing
... requires that a series of physicochemical approaches, databases, and structure-
activity relationships be evaluated prior to any biological testing.").
256 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR TESTING OF
CHEMICALS, SUMMARY OF CONSIDERATIONS IN THE REPORT FROM THE OECD EXPERT
GROUP ON PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 2-4 (1995), available at http://www.ingentaconnect.
com/content/oecd/1607310x/2001/00000001/00000001/9710001e; ROBINSON &
THORN, supra note 69, at 136-37.
257 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(d) (1), 2607(a)(2) (2006) (requiring submission of fol-
lowing information, "insofar as known to the person submitting the notice or insofar
as reasonably ascertainable,": common or trade name, chemical identity, molecular
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risks that a substance poses, it can provide some hints as to what toxic-
ity testing should follow. 258 A substance with a molecular structure
similar to that of a known toxin, for instance, may warrant special
attention.259
Beyond these basic analyses of physical and chemical properties,
in vitro methods can serve as an alternative to animal studies for evalu-
ating at least some types of toxic effects. 260 For example, in vitro tests
are commonly employed to screen for potential carcinogens by evalu-
ating mutations caused by exposure to a chemical. 261 One such test,
the Ames test, looks for mutations resulting from exposing a bacte-
rium to a chemical, and can be performed easily, rapidly, and inex-
pensively. 262 The test can only serve a rough screening function,
however, because of the dissimilarity between bacteria and more com-
plex organisms.263 Positive results can be followed up with more com-
plex tests involving cultured mammalian cells or tissues to look for
gene or chromosomal mutations. 264 A key insight of in vitro science is
that cells and tissues properly grown in vitro retain the properties of
their organs of origin.265 Accordingly, the results of toxicity tests per-
formed on a cell or tissue culture can be extrapolated to the animal
structure, categories of use, amount to be manufactured or processed, resulting
byproducts, number of individuals exposed, and manner of disposal).
258 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 15, 91 (noting influence of chemical structure on
toxicity and other properties); see also Neubert, supra note 243, at 1165 tbl.2 (listing
data needed for an appropriate risk assessment).
259 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 15, 20. Taking this approach one step further,
EPA relies heavily on quantitative structure activity relationship (QSAR) analysis,
which studies the biological activity of a chemical compound in relation to its molecu-
lar structure, to predict how a structurally analogous chemical may react under the
same circumstances. See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 137.
260 See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 49-50; Illing, supra note 242, at
23-24; Spielmann & Goldberg, supra note 255, at 1131, 1131-33.
261 See STELLJES, supra note 253, at 69. Because mutations are only one of several
steps involved in the development of cancer, an in vitro test result revealing an unu-
sual number of mutations by itself does not demonstrate that a chemical is a carcino-
gen. See id.
262 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 211-14; RoBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 38;
Wagner, supra note 26, at 848 (reporting estimated costs of Salmonella assay at
$2000-$4000).
263 See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 38.
264 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 214-15; ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 39.
Using various types of cells or tissues, in vitro tests can also identify reproductive and
developmental effects of chemical exposure. See BARILE, supra note 242, at 229-35
(discussing in vitro techniques to identify reproductive and teratogenic effects);
STELLJES, supra note 253, at 69.
265 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 147 (defining in vitro toxicology as "the handling
of tissues outside of intact organ systems under conditions that support their growth,
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species from which the culture came. In vitro toxicology avoids popu-
lar objections to animal testing and can be performed more quickly
and inexpensively than in vivo tests.266
In vitro tests, however, are subject to a number of limitations.
Although such tests employ cell and tissue cultures derived from living
organisms, these cultures cannot duplicate entire functional sys-
tems. 2 6 7 Consequently, risk assessments based on findings from in
vitro studies must draw a number of inferences that are not required
for assessments based on in vivo studies.268 Validation-the process of
determining that a particular technique is a reliable predictor of toxic-
ity in humans-has been completed for only a handful of in vitro
tests. 2 6 9 Moreover, some areas of toxicology simply cannot be
addressed using in vitro tests. 270 Latent effects, for instance, can be
difficult to study because of natural limitations in the number of divi-
sions that cell lines generally can undergo.271
2. In Vivo Methods
In vivo toxicity studies typically involve testing of animals in a con-
trolled laboratory environment. 272 Studies of different lengths are
used to measure different types of toxicity.2 7 3 Acute studies look for
immediate toxic effects from a single exposure or limited number of
differentiation, and stability"); HARRY SALEM & SIDNEY A. KATz, Toxicriv ASSESSMENT
ALTERNATIVES 3-17 (1999); Spielmann & Goldberg, supra note 255, at 1131.
266 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 148 (noting importance of developing fast, sim-
ple, and effective in vitro test systems, in light of rapid rate at which chemicals are
developed and marketed); Spielmann & Goldberg, supra note 255, at 1133 (listing
advantages and limitations of in vitro toxicity testing); see also CASARETT AND DOULL'S
ToxicoLocy: THE BASIc SCIENCE OF POISONs 32 (Curtis D. Klassen ed., 6th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY] (listing typical costs of toxicity
tests).
267 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 148 ("[T]he use of cell culture does not purport
to represent the whole human organism, but can significantly contribute to our
understanding of the workings of its components.").
268 See Neubert, supra note 243, at 1179.
269 See Balls, supra note 70, at 28-41 (describing validation process and difficulties
involved).
270 See RoBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 52; Heinz-Peter Gelbke et al., Evalua-
tion of Methods for the Registration of Chemicals, in TOXICOLOGY, supra note 243, at 1115,
1117 ("[T]he use of animal studies is in some cases, such as pregnancy, the only
means of obtaining accurate and specific data for a substance with regard to its haz-
ardous potential in humans.").
271 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 153-54.
272 See Illing, supra note 242, at 16.
273 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 89-92; STELuEs, supra note 253, at 61-65.
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exposures.274 Subchronic studies look for adverse effects from short-
term, repeated doses of a chemical which do not produce immediate
toxic effects.2 7 5 These studies are intended to mimic exposure pat-
terns of humans exposed to low levels of chemicals on a daily or
weekly basis. 276 Finally, chronic studies examine health effects from
continuous or intermittent exposure over long periods of time, from
one-tenth of the lifespan of a species up to a lifetime. Such studies
generally seek to uncover cancer, reproductive, or developmental
effects.277 Chronic studies provide the most information regarding
potential toxicity, but require the most time, resources, and plan-
ning.2 78 Whereas acute studies typically run for about fourteen days
and subchronic studies ninety days, chronic studies often last six
months to two years.279
Traditionally, in vivo studies have served as the basis for human
health risk assessment because it is believed that they best mimic
human exposure. 280 In vivo studies can test certain exposure routes
that in vitro studies cannot, and they also can test multiple exposure
routes. 281 Moreover, because testing occurs within living organisms
with operating physiological systems, there is less of an inferential leap
in extrapolating test results to humans. 282 While no animal species
perfectly models the human system,283 appropriate species can be
274 See STELLJES, supra note 253, at 61. Results of acute toxicity tests can be graphi-
cally represented as a dose-response curve. See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at
6. The most common acute test is the median lethal dose (LD5o) test, which is used to
determine the dose of a compound that, when ingested, causes death in half of all test
animals over a certain time period. See BARILE, supra note 242, at 73-87; STELLJES,
supra note 253, at 61.
275 See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 8; STELLJES, supra note 253, at 63-64
(describing subchronic tests).
276 See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 8.
277 See STELMjES, supra note 253, at 66-68.
278 See ROBINsON & THORN, supra note 69, at 9-10; STELLJES, supra note 253, at
64-65. The standard duration of a carcinogenicity test involving rats or mice, for
example, is two years. See STELLJES, supra note 253, at 67.
279 See ROBINSON & THORN, supra note 69, at 6; STELLES, supra note 253, at 96.
280 See Illing, supra note 242, at 16, 24.
281 See STELrjEs, supra note 253, at 60; Spielmann & Goldberg, supra note 255, at
1133 tbl. 2, 1336-37.
282 See Neubert, supra note 243, at 1179 ("Interspecies extrapolations are already
loaded with difficulties. It is obvious that the number of these uncertainties is further
increased when attempting to extrapolate results from in vitro data to the situation in
humans.").
283 See STELuEs, supra note 253, at 91-105 (discussing issues to consider in extra-
polating toxicity data from animal studies to humans). For purposes of determining
safe exposure levels in humans, animal studies typically focus on the highest dose that
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selected for study based on their distinct biological and physiological
features and the similarity of their systems to human systems.284
In vivo studies are likely to be more expensive and time consum-
ing than in vitro studies.28 5 The costs of an in vivo study will depend
on a number of variables, including the animal species used, the num-
ber of animals being tested, the analyses applied, and the length of
the study.286 Costs of in vivo studies range from several thousand dol-
lars for an acute toxicity test involving one route of exposure, to hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars for chronic toxicity tests lasting twelve
months or more.2 87 The number of animals required to demonstrate
a toxic effect is inversely proportional to the probability of that effect
occurring in a human.288 Given the relatively low probability of dis-
covering a toxic effect in any one chemical, 289 large numbers of test
subjects may be needed to demonstrate a causal relationship.29 0 Ulti-
mately, a balance must be struck between cost and ethical concerns-
which argue for studies more limited in scope-and comprehensive-
ness and accuracy in the search for toxic effects. 29 1
C. Applying the Duty to Test in Specific Instances
Ideally, the data gathered from the studies discussed above would
be combined with assessments of human exposure and other data to
generate a comprehensive risk assessment estimating the likelihood of
causes no effect in animals-the "no-observed adverse effect level" (NOAEL). Id. at
93.
284 See STELLJES, supra note 253, at 91-93; Shayne C. Gad, Introduction to ANIMAL
MODELS IN ToxiCOLoGy 5-15 (Shayne C. Gad ed., 2d ed. 2007) (discussing factors
considered in selecting animal models).
285 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 63 ("The overhead associated with establishing
and maintaining an animal care facility may be prohibitive . . . . Interestingly, the
budgets required for animal toxicology testing have, in part, prompted the develop-
ment of in vitro alternative methods with comparatively less expensive require-
ments."). A two-year rodent bioassay designed to reveal carcinogenic effects from
chronic exposure can cost approximately three million dollars. See Gary E. Marchant,
Genetics and the Future of Environmental Policy, in ENVIRONMENTALISM & THE TECHNOLO-
GIES OF ToMoRROw 61, 62 (Robert Olson & David Rejeski eds., 2005).
286 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 63-64.
287 See CASARETr AND DoULL's ToxicoLoGy, supra note 266, at 32.
288 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 64.
289 One commentator estimates the probability of occurrence of toxic effects from
human exposure to most commercial chemicals at < 0.01%. See id.
290 See id. (noting experiment to detect 1:10,000 rate of toxic effects would require
several thousands of animals).
291 See Illing, supra note 242, at 23 ("There is a conflict of interest between the
current, animal test based toxic risk assessment/evaluation procedures and the ability
to depend on alternatives to animal testing.").
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toxicity from exposure to chemicals in the environment. 292 A "state of
the art" risk assessment would draw on the expertise of numerous
scientists, including but not limited to those practicing in the fields of
biology, chemistry, organic chemistry, physics, mathematics, and bios-
tatistics.293 Economic and time constraints make such a process
impractical if not impossible to apply to all chemical substances, how-
ever,294 and in the vast majority of cases, a full-blown risk assessment
should not be required in order to satisfy the duty to test. Rather, a
company should be expected to perform a reasonable amount of test-
ing in light of potential hazards that may be identified.295 What spe-
cific tests must be conducted will vary depending on the
circumstances of each case.
Notwithstanding potential concerns regarding judicial compe-
tency to decide whether a company has conducted sufficient test-
ing, 296 it is worth emphasizing that this is the sort of determination
that courts routinely make. 2 9 7 Product liability litigation involving
defective pharmaceuticals, for instance, often turns on claims that
manufacturers failed to conduct adequate tests to determine drug
292 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
19-28 (1983) (describing four basic steps of risk assessment: hazard identification,
dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization); BARILE,
supra note 242, at 45-47; STELLJES, supra note 253, at 110.
293 See generally STELLJES, supra note 253, at 108-24 (discussing risk assessment);
Arpad Somogyi et al., Regulatory Toxicology, in TOXICOLOGY, supra note 243, at 1139,
1144-46 (same).
294 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND DECISIONS, supra note 3, at 3 (not-
ing that "the regulatory risk assessment process is bogged down" and that major risk
assessments for some chemicals may take more than ten years).
295 See supra Part I.C.1.
296 See Pierce, supra note 19, at 1312-17 (discussing Wagner proposal to relax cau-
sation requirement and expressing skepticism regarding its feasibility); Wagner, supra
note 26, at 841-46 (identifying concerns and recommending development of check-
list of minimal and "state-of-the-art" testing requirements). Pierce's main concern is
that courts would too readily find testing inadequate, imposing sizeable judgments on
manufacturers and making socially beneficial products more expensive or unavaila-
ble. See Pierce, supra note 19, at 1312-13. These concerns are greatly ameliorated
with respect to the cause of action set forth in this Article because only injunctive
relief, and not damages, could be granted.
297 See Berger, supra note 18, at 2151 (contending shift in inquiry to adequacy of
testing will require determinations of negligence "well-suited to the jury's role as a
representative of the community"); E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Manufacturer's Duty to
Test or Inspect as Affecting His Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 6 A.L.R.3d 91, 98 (1966)
(noting that while manufacturer's duty to test or inspect product "may pose widely
varying questions of fact .. . these questions are, essentially, answerable through appli-
cation of basic principles of the law of negligence").
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safety.2 9 8 In these and other cases alleging inadequate testing, courts
consider various circumstances, including the results of initial safety
tests, existing knowledge about related chemicals, consumer com-
plaints, and the economic feasibility of further testing, in determining
what additional testing should have been done. 2 9 9
Identifying a standard set of testing requirements for companies
to follow would reduce the complexity and increase the predictability
ofjudicial determinations regarding whether the duty to test has been
satisfied. One useful starting point is the Screening Information Data
Set (SIDS), an internationally agreed upon set of screening tests iden-
tified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).300 The OECD developed the SIDS program with the
goal of ensuring the availability of basic toxicity information on inter-
national HPV chemicals.301 The SIDS, in the OECD's view, represents
298 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. 1980) (recounting
plaintiffs' allegations that manufacturers of synthetic hormone DES failed to ade-
quately test drug for safety); Strong v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 261 S.W.3d 493, 509-10
(Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (recounting plaintiffs testimony that manufacturers of oral polio
vaccine failed to adequately test vaccine for safety); id. at 511 (noting that "Plaintiff
presented evidence that a failure to test the strain material would have an effect on
safety," and that "reasonable minds could differ about whether Company's failure to
test the strain material resulted in a vaccine that imposed a greater risk").
299 See, e.g., Elam v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 841 N.E.2d 1037, 1043-45 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (holding evidence was sufficient to support jury verdict of failure to investigate
health hazards associated with welding where plaintiff introduced numerous scientific
articles regarding industrial manganese poisoning and where defendants failed to
conduct epidemiological study); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Carus Chem. Co., 378 N.W.2d
830, 836-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding jury instruction that chemical manu-
facturer had duty to test product and to keep informed of scientific knowledge and
discoveries in the field); Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 117-18 (Nev. 1998)
(upholding jury conclusion that company negligently failed to perform additional
safety testing on silicone breast implants), overruled in part on other grounds by GES, Inc.
v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (Nev. 2001); Kellett, supra note 297, at 99 (suggesting rele-
vant considerations include "the dangers to be expected from the product, the exis-
tence of effective tests or inspections, their economic feasibility, and the skill and care
with which the tests or inspections, if any, were performed").
300 See EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 3.
301 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., DECISION-RECOMMENDATION ON THE CO-
OPERATIVE INVESTIGATION AND RISK REDUCTION OF EXISTING CHEMICALS (1991), availa-
ble at http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectlD=09000064
8042d6ad&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. Under the SIDS program,
OECD member countries agreed to cooperate in gathering information regarding
HPV chemicals, performing or mandating testing to generate SIDS data, and assess-
ing the need for further testing. See id.; Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Descrip-
tion of OECD Work on Investigation of High Production Volume Chemicals, http://
www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34379-1939669_I_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Dec. 10, 2009). The OECD defines HPV chemicals as those chemicals pro-
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the minimum amount of data necessary to make an initial hazard
assessment of HPV chemicals and incorporates testing in six basic
endpoint areas: acute toxicity, chronic toxicity, developmental and
reproductive toxicity, mutagenicity, ecotoxicity, and environmental
fate. 302 The SIDS also includes basic information on the identity of
the chemical, its physical and chemical properties, uses, and sources
and extent of exposure.303
The SIDS program sets out a potentially valuable framework for
evaluating a company's testing efforts. Courts should be leery, how-
ever, of relying on the SIDS as the exclusive metric against which to
judge those efforts. On the one hand, the SIDS regime may be inade-
quate to satisfy the duty to test because the SIDS requires only screen-
ing-level data that does not fully measure a chemical's toxicity.304
When such data reveals potential hazards, further investigation may
be necessary. On the other hand, a complete set of SIDS data may not
be necessary in all circumstances. The SIDS requirements, developed
in the context of high production volume chemicals, rest on an
assumption of widespread occupational, consumer, and environmen-
tal exposure.305 Where that assumption does not hold true, reasona-
ble testing may involve less than a SIDS analysis.30 6
duced or imported at levels greater than one-thousand tons per year in at least one
OECD country or in the European Union. See id.
302 EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 2. EPA estimated in 1998 that
the tests necessary to develop the basic set of six SIDS screening test endpoints have a
total cost of approximately $205,000. Id. at 10. Estimated costs of different levels of
testing for chemicals subject to REACH range from C85,000 to C325,000 per sub-
stance. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHITE PAPER ON STRATEGY FOR A
FUTURE CHEMICALS POLICY 15 (2001), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
OriServ/site/en/com/2001/com200l_0088en01.pdf.
303 EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 2-3.
304 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., MANUAL FOR INVESTIGATION OF HPV
CHEMICALS: SIDS, THE SIDS PLAN AND THE SIDS DOSSIER § 2.1 (2006) [hereinafter
OECD, SIDS], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/18/36045056.pdf
(describing SIDS as "the minimum amount of data that is required for making an
initial hazard assessment"); EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 11
(remarking that for many HPV chemicals, "the SIDS battery of tests will not provide
sufficient understanding to adequately assess the hazards and risks"); ENVTL. DEF.,
supra note 79, at 10, 29 (noting that SIDS data "fall well short of what would be
needed to conduct a full hazard or risk assessment," "rel[y] primarily on testing of
acute or subchronic toxicity," and do not "address emerging concerns such as devel-
opment neurotoxicity or endocrine disruption potential").
305 See OECD, SIDS, supra note 304.
306 Moreover, some of the data in a SIDS, such as data on ecotoxicity, is arguably
less important to determining whether adequate testing has been done to reasonably
protect human health. Data on toxicity to fish, aquatic invertebrates, and algae, for
instance, is required in a SIDS, but may not be necessary to satisfy the duty to test. See
2010] 1009
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Another metric that courts could look to is the testing required
under REACH.307 In particular, companies that carry out the chemi-
cal safety assessment (CSA) mandated by REACH for chemicals pro-
duced in quantities over ten tons could be deemed automatically to
have satisfied the duty to test.3 0 8 The judicial recognition of a "safe
harbor" based on performance of a CSA would provide some reassur-
ance to chemical companies who may be fearful that no amount of
testing would ever satisfy a court. Such an approach also would estab-
lish a readily administrable bright-line rule for companies, courts, and
other interested parties.
In a world without transaction costs, determining whether a com-
pany has satisfied the duty to test would involve a case-by-case consid-
eration of the facts and of expert opinions regarding what specific
tests can reveal. If courts opt for such an approach rather than recog-
nizing a safe harbor based on the performance of a CSA, or in
instances where a company has performed some testing short of a full
CSA, the courts can follow guiding principles based on the SIDS pro-
gram and the relative merits of various testing methods. First, basic
chemical analysis should be required in all cases. Analysis of funda-
mental physical and chemical properties, such as molecular structure,
boiling point, melting point, vapor pressure, water solubility, impuri-
ties, and general reactivity should be done as a matter of routine.
Such information is relatively inexpensive to obtain and can be invalu-
able in identifying potential hazards and routes of exposure.309 Sec-
ond, simple in vitro screening tests that have been validated should be
expected for all chemical substances. The Ames test reveals
mutagenicity and is widely recognized as a quick and cost-effective
screen for potential carcinogens.310 Other scientifically validated in
vitro tests, such as tests for skin corrosivity and embryotoxicity, also
generate data that can be usefully extrapolated to in vivo exposure
OECD, SIDS, supra note 304, at annex 1, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
13/17/36045066.pdf.
307 I am indebted to Wendy Wagner for this suggestion.
308 See supra text accompanying note 232.
309 Cf. EUROPEAN CHEMs. AGENCY, supra note 232, at 18-19; OECD, SIDS, supra
note 304, § 2.2.2 (listing physical and chemical properties for which SIDS data is
required).
310 Cf Wagner, supra note 26, at 843-44 (recommending judicial development of
checklist for adequate testing that "might consist of a single in vitro test, like the
widely accepted Salmonella assay, for minimal testing"). Reliance on the Salmonella
assay alone, however, is insufficient because it ignores potential types of toxicity other
than mutagenicity. Id.
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and should be required.3 11 Although low-cost in vitro tests are not yet
available to screen for all types of potential adverse effects, scientists
are developing reliable new methods, and once these methods are val-
idated, they can be incorporated into basic testing requirements.3 1 2
Third, whether further testing should be required will depend on vari-
ous factors, including data from basic chemical analyses, the results of
in vitro screening tests, toxicity data on closely related chemicals, like-
lihood of exposure, probable exposure routes, practicality of addi-
tional testing, and other available information.3 13 More extensive
testing than that required to produce the SIDS may be warranted for
chemicals used in consumer products, for instance, whereas further
testing may be unnecessary for chemicals with more limited exposure
potential.3 14 Fourth, given the scientific expertise and judgment at
issue, courts should view manufacturers' decisions regarding what
tests to conduct with some deference. Manufacturers have a duty to
undertake reasonable testing, not the amount of testing that a court
would do if it were a manufacturer with unlimited time and resources.
This deference does not mean, however, that courts should be blind
to the economic and legal incentives for industry to do insufficient
safety testing.315 Rather, courts should give a hard look at testing deci-
sions but recognize the limits of their own knowledge and experi-
ence.s16 Taken together, these guidelines can add an element of
311 See BARILE, supra note 242, at 175-84; Balls, supra note 70, at 30-31 (listing
validated in vitro tests).
312 See STELLJES, supra note 253, at 69; Balls, supra note 70, at 31 (listing examples
of in vitro methods being validated or prepared for validation). See generally COMm.
ON ToxicITY TESTING & ASSESSMENT OF ENvrtL. AGENTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
Toxicrry TESTING IN THE 21sT CENTURY 46, 52 (2007) (advocating efforts to develop
toxicity testing paradigm based exclusively on in vitro testing that would identify rele-
vant biologic perturbations of cellular pathways).
313 Cf OECD, SIDS, supra note 304, § 2.3.1 (suggesting factors to consider in
assessing the need for additional testing beyond data initially gathered under SIDS
program).
314 See EPA, CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA, supra note 6, at 9; OECD, SIDS, supra note
304, § 2.3.1.
315 See supra Part I. With respect to the data gathered under EPA's HPV Challenge
Program, for instance, chemical sponsors have been criticized for relying on inappro-
priate surrogate chemicals or on overly broad chemical categories. See ENVrL. DEF.,
supra note 79, at 25.
316 This hard look review would be comparable to that performed by courts in
reviewing agency decisions involving matters of technical expertise. Under such
review, courts ensure that an agency "examine [d] the relevant data and articulate [d]
a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.'" Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc v. United
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consistency to a flexible inquiry and offer substantive direction to
states assessing whether adequate testing has been done, to companies
attempting to satisfy their testing obligations, and to courts charged
with evaluating testing efforts.
CONCLUSION
Public nuisance actions offer a potentially powerful tool to goad
chemical manufacturers into performing safety testing that they
already should be doing under fundamental principles of tort law and
responsible corporate behavior. The range of chemicals possibly sub-
ject to such actions is quite broad, but public officials would almost
certainly focus their limited resources on a narrow subset of the
thousands of chemicals found in commerce. In setting their priorities
for investigation and subsequent litigation, officials likely would con-
sider factors relating to both risk and exposure. On the risk side,
these factors could include: anecdotal accounts of adverse effects; sta-
tistical clusters of symptoms or illness; known or suspected hazards in
similar chemicals; or studies suggesting positive correlations between
chemical exposure and illness, even if those correlations fall short of
statistical significance. On the exposure side, factors worth consider-
ing might include: widespread distribution or use of a chemical;
intended use or foreseeable misuse of a chemical product; likely expo-
sure among children, pregnant women, and other vulnerable popula-
tions; and the tendency of a chemical to disperse in the environment.
None of this is to suggest that any of these factors is necessary in order
to bring a failure to test claim; rather, these factors are among those
that may be relevant to the choice of chemicals to target for public
nuisance actions.
Ultimately, a statutory mandate to develop risk assessments for all
chemicals in commerce-or even a more limited approach akin to
REACH-could serve as a more comprehensive response to the wide-
spread failure of manufacturers, processors, and distributors to con-
duct adequate testing. Whether such a mandate will be enacted in the
near future, however, is uncertain, given the opposition it would likely
encounter from the chemical industry.317 Public nuisance actions for
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); see also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (describing court's role to "undertake[ ] a study of the
record . . . even as to the evidence on technical and specialized matters").
317 In 2008, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representatives Hilda Solis and Henry
Waxman introduced a bill titled the Kid Safe Chemical Act. H.R. 6100, 110th Cong.,
2d Sess. (2008); S. 3040, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008). The bill, which did not make it
out of committee hearings would have significantly reformed TSCA. Legislators are
planning on reintroducing similar legislation in the near future. See Press Release of
[VOL. 85-31012
DECIPHERING THE CHEMICAL SOUP
failure to test can help to address the toxicity gap in the meantime
and lay the foundation for a broader statutory mandate.3 1 8  Such
actions can be brought immediately, without any legislative action,
and can be brought by one or more states, consistent with their signifi-
cant role in U.S. environmental policy.31 9 The bringing of failure-to-
test actions, and the possibility that such actions may be brought, will
force more manufacturers to take seriously their obligations to ensure
that the chemicals that they introduce into commerce and the envi-
ronment are reasonably safe.
Senator Lautenberg, Lautenberg: CDC Study Reveals Need to Reform Chemical
Safety Standards (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://lautenberg.senate.gov/news-
room/record.cfm?id=320691.
318 See Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate
Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets Into Common Law Remedies, 155
U. PA. L. REv. 1563, 1572-77 (2007) (describing potential for state-initiated public
nuisance litigation to trigger federal regulatory response in context of climate
change).
319 See generally David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1796, 1796
(2008) ("The current system of environmental federalism is thus a dynamic one of
overlapping federal and state jurisdiction."); William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environ-
mental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 108, 108 (2005) (contending that "overlap,
cooperative federalism structures, and redundant enforcement mechanisms . . .
[within] the American system of environmental federalism reduce the risk of regula-
tory underkill that can result from failures to address environmental ills, as well as
failures adequately to fund, implement and enforce written laws and regulations");
Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons From State Climate Change
Efforts, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1653, 1656 (2008) ("[S]tate common law and regulatory
efforts to control GHG emissions illustrate today's almost complete linkage between
the common law of torts and the regulatory state in areas of public health, safety, and
environmental protection.").
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